There are two main natural aspects in which human beings behave: one is to oppress and the other is to be oppressed. There are also two other different natural ways in which human beings live: to express themselves so that they will be understood in the manners that they want to be understood, or to have no opinions and to accept others' opinions as ways to learn and to understand others. The results of these behaviors are freedom of oppression as well as freedom of speech, or freedom of expression. Springing from these matters is the matter of censoring ideas or opinions expressed in written forms, and this is a problem that I am going to analyze in the below paragraphs.
Some human beings cannot live without showing or describing themselves or mentioning about their concerns of other people. We also learn from Hobbes that in the state of nature, human beings will inevitably be led into conflicts with one another in efforts to preserve themselves. Thus, life is constant struggles among a society. Since any society has a government to control the activities of the citizens in a country, there will certainly be agreements and disagreements between citizens and the government, or between different organizations, individuals, etc., and thereof, the control of the government over these disagreements, especially disagreements in writing or speech, eventually leads to the problem of censorship. There are many kinds of censorship: censorship conducted by the government, censorship conducted by private organizations, and even individual censorship.
First, I will talk about governmental censorship. In our text book, Law and Philosophy, in Chapter 5, Section A, John Hospers writes:
Government is the most dangerous institution known to man. Throughout history
it has violated the rights of men more than any individual or group of individuals
could do: it has killed people, enslaved them, sent them to forced labor and
concentration camps, and regularly robbed and pillaged them of the fruits of their
expended labor. Unlike individual criminals, government has the power to arrest
and try; unlike individual criminals, it can surround and encompass a person totally,
dominating every aspect of one's life, so that one has no recourse from it but to
leave the country...
Thus, when people are opposing something in the ruling policy that the government doesn't do correctly or violating their rights, they express their oppositions by speech or writing; as a result, sometimes, the government will eliminate parts of the documents written that will harm its reputation, and this is what governmental censorship is about. It is the true value of the writing piece, or parts of it that the government doesn't want to know or doesn't want to be exposed to the public's knowledge. Sometimes, the government suppresses it because they believe that it is not true or because they deny the truth of it.
Other kinds of censorship is the censorship that is conducted by private organizations or individuals. For private organizations, the reason for censoring is the same as the reason of a government; that is the documents are protesting against the reputation of that organization. Sometimes, a writing expression is not protesting against an organization but against the government, and the organization still eliminate parts of the document because they are afraid of being condemned by the government and therefore to censor it on behalf of the government. Individual censorship can also happen; for example, when one person is writing something that may harm another person's reputation, the other person would not allow that information to be proliferated, and will extrude that information from circulation.
There is an important matter that needs to be aware of about censorship; that is, it is not only used to protect the reputation of an individual, an organization or a government, but it also is used to benefits or gain advantages over the opponents. And this is the most selfish kind of censorship because it takes advantages from others using its own power. For example, the use of censorship for monopoly purposes, or to prevent better ideas or conflict ideas that one organization or an individual can do to another organization or another individual. This kind of censorship, of course, will violate the rights of some people and therefore can be considered as non-violence fights among people or groups of people. Only justice or fair judgments can be used to determine and prevent this profitable problem.
What are other nature reasons for freedom of speech or expression and for the cause of the problem of censorship? According to John Stuart Mill, in our textbooks, in the article "Truth as a Value of Free Speech", mankind has a tendency to seek wisdom and knowledge as well as ways to possess happiness; therefore, the need for intellectual advancements is what causes mankind to have speech and expression. In addition, as I already mentioned in the above paragraphs that to tell the truth is what construct or initiate free speech or expression, Mill presents the same concept:
Instrumental defenses of free speech focuses on one of two values promoted
by free speech - truth and democracy. Utilitarian John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)
took up the case for truth, and his On Liberty (1859) has become its classic
defense... According to Mill, speech competes in a marketplace of ideas, where
truth and falsehood try to outbid one another. Society has no reason to think
that it has enough knowledge to predudge whether a claim is true or false. If
society suppresses a truth, it denies itself a valuable piece of knowledge; if it
suppresses a falsehood, then it denies the fuller understanding that comes from
contrasting truth with error. The argument, of course, assumes that truth will
prevail in the long run under conditions of open discussion. (Simon, 230)
Thus, we see that to suppress an expression or a speech is an action against the progression and the innovation of human life whether the value of that expression or speech is true or false. In case of a suppression of a true expression or speech, it becomes oppression or coercion if government is involved. However, we also should know why censorship is allowed as former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Well Holmes remarked, "The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shoutint fire in a theater and causing panic" (Simon, 233). Thus, censorship is useful when used to limit some types of speech such as fighting words, libel, obscenity. In these cases, censorship doesn't violate someone's private right; instead, it protects society from being exposed to unwelcome indecency or sensuality expressed by insolent people. And I agree that this kind of censorship should be maintained because nowadays, there are many literary works, press columns or journal articles that use many cursing words, and describe scenes that are considered sexually dirty, and especially the pornography problem that can have bad influences on virtuous or moral values.
Moreover, censorship is used beyond the above basic need of preventing immoral values; it is used to limit harmful speech or expression: "Mill justifies limiting speech with his harm principle, which states that actual or potential harm to others provides the only justification for limiting speech. If a person's thought or action would harm another, then the government is justified in imposing limitations" (Simon, 233). And the second case for limits on speech or expression is that all the harmless forms of speech are not equal and that some forms of speech or expression have higher values than others. For example, in this case, political speech receives more protection than commercial speech that is false, deceptive, or misleading.
In conclusion, in my opinion, if the purpose of censorship is to prevent immoral values to be taught or expressed to good and virtuous citizens, and to promote virtuous or moral values against bad and vice actions then this kind of censorship should be maitained and practiced. Or if the purpose of censorship is to prevent harmful speech or expressions that can deprecate or devaluate the value or reputation of individuals, organizations then it is also should be maintained and approved. However, if censorship is used for oppression or suppression purposes such as to take advantages from others or to impede the truths or to make profits then it is certainly bad and should be limited or prevented.
References
Simon, Thomas W. Law and Philosophy - An Introduction with Readings. New york: McGraw-Hill Companies, 2001.
Wednesday, May 28, 2008
Tuesday, May 27, 2008
Internalism and Hobbe's Laws of Contracts
We know that early internalists use Aristotelian science of ethics and Socrates' individual virtues as the foundations for their argumentative ideas regarding internalism; however, Hobbes is one of the modern philosophers who does not favor individual virtues because he believes that in a natural state which is a state of scarcity, human beings as individuals are free and equal, and they inevitably have trends to preserve themselves and to compete with one another over scarce resources. Thus, to Hobbes, to live in peace is to establish laws or contracts that enable human beings in seeking peace and in doing justice to one another. In Chapter 15 of Leviathan, Hobbes talks about a fool who resembles the fool described by Glaucon in Socrates' Republic in one main point that they both think that there is no justice. To see why Hobbes brings up this topic of the fool and for what reasons that it makes the circumtances of the fool's thoughts relate to his political science, and to find out if Hobbes is an internalist, we need to analyze what is said by him about the fool; thus the following paragraphs will be responsible for undertaking this purpose.
First of all, I think I should mention the most important ethical principle that Aristotle as a follower of Socrates' ethics uses that the internalists also use as their ethical guide; that is reasoning which requires a virtuous internalist to have in order for him to become virtuous. Based on this requirement, Hobbes thinks that a fool can misuse of it to promote the kind of justice that satisfies his own preservations that are considered as an aim to seek goodness and happiness which in turn satisfies Aristotelian virtue. Hobbes' idea of the fool is obviously diffferent from Glaucon's fool because Glaucon's fool does not have any knowing of what the right goodness or happiness is except being forced by external power for being unjust. The reason that Glaucon takes as his motivation for doing injustice is because "someone who has power to do this, however, and is a true man wouldn't make an agreement with anyone not to do injustice in order not to suffer it" (Plato, 35). What Glaucon means is that a powerful person will do injustice because he cannot suffer the injustice that others do to him; thus he must do the same thing that others do because he doesn't believe that there is justice within a society where people are willing to do unjust things for their own benefits. So, one would do unjust things if he or she has the opportunity to do it.
Unlike Glaucon's fool, Hobbes' fool thinks that if something is considered to be good by one person, it is also considered to be good by another; thus if someone who does good things to preserve himself well then there is nothing harmful to another person for that reason. For example, if I want to eat a good meal, and if I can afford it, can what I do harm other people? Of course not, because other people do the same thing I do; that is to want to obtain good meals for themselves. Thus, there are no unjust actions that one do that can harm others. Hobbes writes:
...there could be no reason why every man might not do what he
thought conduced thereunto, and therefore also to make or not to make,
keep or not keep, covenant was not against reason, when it conduced to
one's benefit. (Hobbes, 90)
Hobbes' fool then question that whether injustice may exist with the reason that requires every man to do his own good? Since as explained above that when a man do good things for himself, that action is not considered as an unjust action because every man is entitled to be able to take care of his or her life good because no one would be better to take care of our lives than ourselves. Thus there is not injustice involving in doing one's own goods.
Hobbes' fool even doesn't care whether other people have power or not or whether they will do injustice or not since he can obtain good things for himself or do just things for himself without intervening with others' lives. And in such a society where "it is impossible to receive hurt by it and if it be not against reason, it is not against injustice, or else justice is not to be approved for good" (Hobbes, 90). So, we see that Hobbes' fool uses reasoning to protect himself when he says that "there is no such thing as injustice" because what he means is that it is not against reason to do one's own good, and it is not an unjust action to take care good of one's own life. But the reason why Hobbes wants to show the fool's story is to show that the fool's idea is false when he says that there is no injustice.
What Hobbes means is that the fool is not wise when he thinks that there is always justice in a society and that all every one does is just things. By not knowing that people are malicious and will do unjust things when they have opportunities to do them, the fool will suffer injustice caused by other people. Thus, to protect equal rights of every man in a society, laws must be established, or contracts must be established in order to demand people to do just actions to one another.
To Hobbes, although a fool is an internalist who thinks that doing one's own good things is a just action because it is not against reasoning, I don't think Hobbes himself is an absolute internalis because he doesn't believe that people themselves are honest, and therefore he cannot be classified as an ethical internalist since internalists believe in their self-education to become virtuous people. And Aristotle is the first internalist who thinks that one should obtain virtue by himself based on the definition of virtue as the excellent activity of the soul for a soul is something inside one's mind; thus, he must obtain virtue as the activities of his own soul, and therefore, this condition makes him become an internalist. But Hobbes objects this idea by saying that every one is more likely to compete one another over scarce resources and therefore is not able to comply with the rules of the soul. Consequently, Hobbes has a trend to become an externalist because he believes in the external conditions such as scarce resources, competitions, others' own power to commit injustice, etc. as the main conditions that can affect the just people from doing just actions.
However, if we consider that Hobbes is a philosopher who uses reason to help obtain natural laws that are beneficial to a society then we can accept him as an internalist since a traditional or ancient internalist is one whose judgments for doing justice is to use reasoning, a condition that makes use of the advantage of the soul. "Political philosophers in the natural law tradition maintain that reason dictates for each of us the basic laws that ought to govern our dealings with other persons. Hobbes embraces these tradition, for his time, radical view of human reason. For Hobbes, reason is an instrument or a tool allowing human beings to satisfy their appetites more effectively." (Hurley, 275)
In conclusion, I think Hobbes is in between an internalist and an externalist because although he uses reasoning to obtain new laws that are known in another term as "contracts", he still thinks that external conditions can prevent human beings from being virtuous or just, and that human beings must be controlled by covenants, or laws in order to avoid doing unjust things to one another. In other words, he is the kind of a modern internalist who objects the traditional ways of obtaining justice through self-education and is the one who accepts obligations as a means to compel human beings to do justice.
Works Cited
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Ed. Edwin Curley. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994.
Hurley et al. History of Philosophy. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993.
Plato. Republic. Trans. G.M.A. Grube. Ed. C.D.C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992.
First of all, I think I should mention the most important ethical principle that Aristotle as a follower of Socrates' ethics uses that the internalists also use as their ethical guide; that is reasoning which requires a virtuous internalist to have in order for him to become virtuous. Based on this requirement, Hobbes thinks that a fool can misuse of it to promote the kind of justice that satisfies his own preservations that are considered as an aim to seek goodness and happiness which in turn satisfies Aristotelian virtue. Hobbes' idea of the fool is obviously diffferent from Glaucon's fool because Glaucon's fool does not have any knowing of what the right goodness or happiness is except being forced by external power for being unjust. The reason that Glaucon takes as his motivation for doing injustice is because "someone who has power to do this, however, and is a true man wouldn't make an agreement with anyone not to do injustice in order not to suffer it" (Plato, 35). What Glaucon means is that a powerful person will do injustice because he cannot suffer the injustice that others do to him; thus he must do the same thing that others do because he doesn't believe that there is justice within a society where people are willing to do unjust things for their own benefits. So, one would do unjust things if he or she has the opportunity to do it.
Unlike Glaucon's fool, Hobbes' fool thinks that if something is considered to be good by one person, it is also considered to be good by another; thus if someone who does good things to preserve himself well then there is nothing harmful to another person for that reason. For example, if I want to eat a good meal, and if I can afford it, can what I do harm other people? Of course not, because other people do the same thing I do; that is to want to obtain good meals for themselves. Thus, there are no unjust actions that one do that can harm others. Hobbes writes:
...there could be no reason why every man might not do what he
thought conduced thereunto, and therefore also to make or not to make,
keep or not keep, covenant was not against reason, when it conduced to
one's benefit. (Hobbes, 90)
Hobbes' fool then question that whether injustice may exist with the reason that requires every man to do his own good? Since as explained above that when a man do good things for himself, that action is not considered as an unjust action because every man is entitled to be able to take care of his or her life good because no one would be better to take care of our lives than ourselves. Thus there is not injustice involving in doing one's own goods.
Hobbes' fool even doesn't care whether other people have power or not or whether they will do injustice or not since he can obtain good things for himself or do just things for himself without intervening with others' lives. And in such a society where "it is impossible to receive hurt by it and if it be not against reason, it is not against injustice, or else justice is not to be approved for good" (Hobbes, 90). So, we see that Hobbes' fool uses reasoning to protect himself when he says that "there is no such thing as injustice" because what he means is that it is not against reason to do one's own good, and it is not an unjust action to take care good of one's own life. But the reason why Hobbes wants to show the fool's story is to show that the fool's idea is false when he says that there is no injustice.
What Hobbes means is that the fool is not wise when he thinks that there is always justice in a society and that all every one does is just things. By not knowing that people are malicious and will do unjust things when they have opportunities to do them, the fool will suffer injustice caused by other people. Thus, to protect equal rights of every man in a society, laws must be established, or contracts must be established in order to demand people to do just actions to one another.
To Hobbes, although a fool is an internalist who thinks that doing one's own good things is a just action because it is not against reasoning, I don't think Hobbes himself is an absolute internalis because he doesn't believe that people themselves are honest, and therefore he cannot be classified as an ethical internalist since internalists believe in their self-education to become virtuous people. And Aristotle is the first internalist who thinks that one should obtain virtue by himself based on the definition of virtue as the excellent activity of the soul for a soul is something inside one's mind; thus, he must obtain virtue as the activities of his own soul, and therefore, this condition makes him become an internalist. But Hobbes objects this idea by saying that every one is more likely to compete one another over scarce resources and therefore is not able to comply with the rules of the soul. Consequently, Hobbes has a trend to become an externalist because he believes in the external conditions such as scarce resources, competitions, others' own power to commit injustice, etc. as the main conditions that can affect the just people from doing just actions.
However, if we consider that Hobbes is a philosopher who uses reason to help obtain natural laws that are beneficial to a society then we can accept him as an internalist since a traditional or ancient internalist is one whose judgments for doing justice is to use reasoning, a condition that makes use of the advantage of the soul. "Political philosophers in the natural law tradition maintain that reason dictates for each of us the basic laws that ought to govern our dealings with other persons. Hobbes embraces these tradition, for his time, radical view of human reason. For Hobbes, reason is an instrument or a tool allowing human beings to satisfy their appetites more effectively." (Hurley, 275)
In conclusion, I think Hobbes is in between an internalist and an externalist because although he uses reasoning to obtain new laws that are known in another term as "contracts", he still thinks that external conditions can prevent human beings from being virtuous or just, and that human beings must be controlled by covenants, or laws in order to avoid doing unjust things to one another. In other words, he is the kind of a modern internalist who objects the traditional ways of obtaining justice through self-education and is the one who accepts obligations as a means to compel human beings to do justice.
Works Cited
Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Ed. Edwin Curley. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994.
Hurley et al. History of Philosophy. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993.
Plato. Republic. Trans. G.M.A. Grube. Ed. C.D.C. Reeve. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992.
Tuesday, May 20, 2008
Hume's Moving from "Is" to "Ought"
Although Hume is a naturalist who seeks to compare human actions as those that are governed by natural laws, he is not completely mechanistic about this idea. Hume still has many explanations that focus on human rationalization and consciousness, and due to these flexible understandings, Hume is also best known for subjectivism which establishes many good grounds for morality. That is why he says that when moving from 'is' to 'ought' "a reason should be given... "To see whether he contradicts himself when jumping from natural laws to human laws and reasoning which at first to him seem not to be primary motivations to act morally, I need to summarize some of his main ideas and concepts and also his arguments presented in the Treatise as well as to provide my own assessment for this issue.
First of all, we know that Hume asserts in the Treatise that reason has no capacity to motivate people to act, and that only feelings, desires and passions motivate people to act. These ideas, I think, don't assist finally in concluding by Hume that we should not use reasoning to assist in our moral actions. In contrary, Hume thinks that the rules of morality are not conclusions of our reason, but morality is another term to represent for our moral sentiments that are the results from our reasoning. In another word, the reasoning process provides us to have sentiments or feelings about what is right and what is wrong, and these feelings in turn become our moral senses. More specifically speaking, reason cannot cause us to act morally, but give us the necessary senses and feelings that urge and motivate us to do the right actions. From reasoning, we create our special feelings of whether to do something is right or wrong, and from these feelings we proceed to act accordingly and righteously. In short, Hume still doesn't deny that it is feelings or moral senses that motivate us to act virtuously not reason.
To understand better how Hume's moving from 'is' to 'ought' is the result in reason, we need to understand that 'what is' means what naturally is or what we feel according to our natural contacts with the environment around us. For example, the proposition 'he is thirsty' describes the natural state of a person who is longing for a drink of water, and describes him in natural senses. There is no reason why the man is thirsty because it is a natural or physical state that every living thing can experience since when someone is thirsty, he is thirsty. There is no reason why he must be thirsty because drinking and eating are natural demands for living things not because there is a reason why he has to be thirsty. For the proposition such as 'he ought not kill', we see that there is a reason why he 'ought not' rather than why he 'does not kill'; it is because the statement: 'he doesn't kill' does not has any moral meaning or sense while there is a reason for why he ought not kill in the 'ought' statement; that is, killing causes pain or serious injure to another person. Thus, when one hears the word 'killing', he will have an impression of a person who is seriously injured and is dying, and thus he feels terrible or feels the same pains that the dying person is having. These painful feelings will give him a moral sense that he ought not kill because he doesn't want to do something that causes terrible pains to someone with the exchange or the hope that the other person will not do the same terrible pains to him. Hume takes after Hobbes in this silent mutual agreement that can cause benefit to everyone in order to establish mutual laws that can bring equal benefit between two persons to be moral grounds to motivate moral senses. Thus, now, we understand the distinction between a moral sense and a reason that is just a rationalizing statement that cannot cause feelings or senses. To Hume, "reasoning become a tool, the use of which will allow us to determine the most effective means to whatever aims our sentiments and other passions lead us to desire." (Hurley 296)
Hume writes in the Treatise that "moral excites passions, and produces or prevents actions." What he means is that when one recognizes that a particular action violates a moral rule, one is not motivated to perform the action. And how one recognizes what particular action is right or wrong is what I just gave out as an example in the above paragraph that a man knows the terrible feelings given from a seriously injured person would probably avoid the act of killing by doing the same seriously injuring action to someone. Thus, we see that a reason statement such as "you ought not kill because that is against morality", or "it is reasonable not to kill someone in order for not to be killed by someone else" has no stronger motivation for us in order to prevent us from killing than a statement that says "killing means thrusting or stabbing someone to dead", obviously, the last sentence really describes how painful and how terrified it is if we have to commit a murder, and this would prevent us immediately from having even killing thoughts. Therefore, now, we know that why Hume thinks moral sense is the primary ground for acting morally and that the 'ought' that is to direct us what we should do or should not do is not from the effect of a reasoning statement but from the effect of a moral sense or feeling. Thus, Hume doesn't jump from 'is' to 'ought' without sufficient explanations as to what moral sense means and what ground is primary for morality.
Since reason cannot motivate, and morality can, Hume concludes that the rules of morality are not conclusions of our reason, but are conclusions from our moral senses, and moral sense conduces moral duty. Thus, "when moral duty motivates a person to act contrary to his selfish desires, what occurs is a conflict ultimately between certain moral sentiments that lead the person to desire to act morally and certain feelings that lead the person to desire to act contrary to the dictates of morality." (Hurley 297). Here we see that only feelings are acting against feelings; there is not a feeling that is acting against something that is not a feeling such as a reason, nor is there any reason acting against feelings or actions because as Hume already says that "reason can never immediately prevent or produce any action by contradicting or approving of it, it cannot be the source of the distinction between moral good and evil, which are found to have that influence." (Hume 3.1.1)
In conclusion, morality is grounded in certain particular feelings that people have, sentiments that generate the desire to act morally. In another word, moral goodness and virtue are manifested by the occurrence of a feeling of satisfaction or pleasure, and moral depravity and vice are manifested by the occurrence of a pain or a feeling of disapprobation. That means whether we approve an action to be a moral or an immoral one is because the feelings or sentiments we have for it not because we understand just the conception that is a result of a reason or an abstract reasoning. From feelings that cause pain and dissatisfied mental states, we are driven in an 'ought' way to act towards morality, and thus our morality is learned through sense and feeling rather than from reasoning.
References
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed. David and Mary Norton. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Hurley et al. History of Philosophy. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993.
First of all, we know that Hume asserts in the Treatise that reason has no capacity to motivate people to act, and that only feelings, desires and passions motivate people to act. These ideas, I think, don't assist finally in concluding by Hume that we should not use reasoning to assist in our moral actions. In contrary, Hume thinks that the rules of morality are not conclusions of our reason, but morality is another term to represent for our moral sentiments that are the results from our reasoning. In another word, the reasoning process provides us to have sentiments or feelings about what is right and what is wrong, and these feelings in turn become our moral senses. More specifically speaking, reason cannot cause us to act morally, but give us the necessary senses and feelings that urge and motivate us to do the right actions. From reasoning, we create our special feelings of whether to do something is right or wrong, and from these feelings we proceed to act accordingly and righteously. In short, Hume still doesn't deny that it is feelings or moral senses that motivate us to act virtuously not reason.
To understand better how Hume's moving from 'is' to 'ought' is the result in reason, we need to understand that 'what is' means what naturally is or what we feel according to our natural contacts with the environment around us. For example, the proposition 'he is thirsty' describes the natural state of a person who is longing for a drink of water, and describes him in natural senses. There is no reason why the man is thirsty because it is a natural or physical state that every living thing can experience since when someone is thirsty, he is thirsty. There is no reason why he must be thirsty because drinking and eating are natural demands for living things not because there is a reason why he has to be thirsty. For the proposition such as 'he ought not kill', we see that there is a reason why he 'ought not' rather than why he 'does not kill'; it is because the statement: 'he doesn't kill' does not has any moral meaning or sense while there is a reason for why he ought not kill in the 'ought' statement; that is, killing causes pain or serious injure to another person. Thus, when one hears the word 'killing', he will have an impression of a person who is seriously injured and is dying, and thus he feels terrible or feels the same pains that the dying person is having. These painful feelings will give him a moral sense that he ought not kill because he doesn't want to do something that causes terrible pains to someone with the exchange or the hope that the other person will not do the same terrible pains to him. Hume takes after Hobbes in this silent mutual agreement that can cause benefit to everyone in order to establish mutual laws that can bring equal benefit between two persons to be moral grounds to motivate moral senses. Thus, now, we understand the distinction between a moral sense and a reason that is just a rationalizing statement that cannot cause feelings or senses. To Hume, "reasoning become a tool, the use of which will allow us to determine the most effective means to whatever aims our sentiments and other passions lead us to desire." (Hurley 296)
Hume writes in the Treatise that "moral excites passions, and produces or prevents actions." What he means is that when one recognizes that a particular action violates a moral rule, one is not motivated to perform the action. And how one recognizes what particular action is right or wrong is what I just gave out as an example in the above paragraph that a man knows the terrible feelings given from a seriously injured person would probably avoid the act of killing by doing the same seriously injuring action to someone. Thus, we see that a reason statement such as "you ought not kill because that is against morality", or "it is reasonable not to kill someone in order for not to be killed by someone else" has no stronger motivation for us in order to prevent us from killing than a statement that says "killing means thrusting or stabbing someone to dead", obviously, the last sentence really describes how painful and how terrified it is if we have to commit a murder, and this would prevent us immediately from having even killing thoughts. Therefore, now, we know that why Hume thinks moral sense is the primary ground for acting morally and that the 'ought' that is to direct us what we should do or should not do is not from the effect of a reasoning statement but from the effect of a moral sense or feeling. Thus, Hume doesn't jump from 'is' to 'ought' without sufficient explanations as to what moral sense means and what ground is primary for morality.
Since reason cannot motivate, and morality can, Hume concludes that the rules of morality are not conclusions of our reason, but are conclusions from our moral senses, and moral sense conduces moral duty. Thus, "when moral duty motivates a person to act contrary to his selfish desires, what occurs is a conflict ultimately between certain moral sentiments that lead the person to desire to act morally and certain feelings that lead the person to desire to act contrary to the dictates of morality." (Hurley 297). Here we see that only feelings are acting against feelings; there is not a feeling that is acting against something that is not a feeling such as a reason, nor is there any reason acting against feelings or actions because as Hume already says that "reason can never immediately prevent or produce any action by contradicting or approving of it, it cannot be the source of the distinction between moral good and evil, which are found to have that influence." (Hume 3.1.1)
In conclusion, morality is grounded in certain particular feelings that people have, sentiments that generate the desire to act morally. In another word, moral goodness and virtue are manifested by the occurrence of a feeling of satisfaction or pleasure, and moral depravity and vice are manifested by the occurrence of a pain or a feeling of disapprobation. That means whether we approve an action to be a moral or an immoral one is because the feelings or sentiments we have for it not because we understand just the conception that is a result of a reason or an abstract reasoning. From feelings that cause pain and dissatisfied mental states, we are driven in an 'ought' way to act towards morality, and thus our morality is learned through sense and feeling rather than from reasoning.
References
Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature. Ed. David and Mary Norton. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Hurley et al. History of Philosophy. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993.
Monday, May 19, 2008
Hume vs. Descartes in Skepticism
In part 1 of Section 2 of An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume talks about two kinds of skepticism, antecedent and consequent skepticisms. The first kind is known as the cartesan doubt which serves as "a sovereign preservative against error and precipitate judgment." The latter kind is known as consequent skepticism that is against the evidence of sense and is derived from the imperfection and fallaciousness of our organs such as: the crooked appearance of an oar in water, the various aspects of objects according to their different distances, the double images which arise from pressing one eye, etc. To Hume, the first kind "were it ever possible to be attained by any human creature (as it plainly is not) woulf be entirely incurable and no reasoning could ever bring us to a state of assurance and conviction upon any subject." And "it recommends a universal doubt not only of all our former opinions and principles, but also of our very faculties. But neither is there any such original principle which has a prerogative above others that are self-evident and convincing. Or if there were," he opposes, "could we advance a step beyond it by the use of those very faculties of which we are supposed to be already diffident?" For the second kind, there are a lot of questions that Hume asks to check to see whether they are good skepticisms. Hume says, "it seems evident that men are carried by a natural instinct or propossession to repose faith in their senses, and that without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we always suppose an external uiverse which does not depend on our perception, but would exist though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated." What he means is that our senses present the natural things around to us and we cannot recognize or know natural thing without senses, and that our senses are our foremost and closest teachers of our knowledge. Hume says,
This very table which we see white and which we feel hard is believed to exist independent of our perception and to be something external to our mind which perceives it. Our presence does not bestow being on it. Our absence does not annihilate it. Its preserves its existence uniform and entire, independent of the situation of intelligent beins who perceive or contemplate it. (551)
Of the second kind of skepticism, Hume says, there is another skeptical topic of the like nature that is derived from the most profound philosophy which - I think, he implies Berkeley's immeterialism - "might merit our attention were it requisite to dive so deep in order to discover arguments and reasonings which can so little serve to any serious purpose. It is universally allowed by modern inquirers that all the sensible qualities of objects, such as hard, soft, hot, cold, white, black, etc. are merely secondary and do not exist in the objects themselves, but are perceptions of the mind, without any external archetype or model which they represent... or can the latter be any more entitled to that denomination than the former." (552) To this skeptical topic, Hume opposes with the following comments:
Nothing can save us from this conclusion but asserting that the ideas of those primary qualities are attained by abstraction, an opinion which, if we examine it accurately, we shall find to be unintelligible and even absurd. An extension that is neither tangible nor visible cannot possibly be conceived, and a tangible or visible extension which is neither hard nor soft, black nor white, is equally beyond the reach of human conception. (552)
To give a final conclusion about these two main skepticisms. Hume writes:
The first philosophical objection to the evidence of sense or to the opinion of external existence consists in this, that such an opinion, if rested on natural instinct, is contrary to reason, if referred to reason, is contrary to natural instince and at the same time carries no rational evidence with it to convince an impartial inquirer. The second objection goes further and represents this opinion as contrary to reason, at least, if it is a principle of reason that all sensible qualities are in the mind, not in the subject. Deprive matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary, you in a manner annihilate it and leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable something as the cause of our perceptions - a notion so imperfect that no skeptic will think it worthwhile to contend against it. (553)
In part II of section 12, Hume classifies skepticisms into another two main kinds, the first kind that "is against all abstract reasoning" and the second kind that are "skeptical objections to moral evidence or to the reasonings concerning matter of fact." To the first kind, Hume says,
No priestly dogmas invented on purpose to tame and subdue the rebellious reason of mankind ever shocked common sense more than the doctrine of infinite divisibility of extension, with its consequences as they are pompously displayed by all geometers and metaphysicians with a kind of triumph and exultation. A real quantity, containing quantity, infinitely less than any finite quantity, containing quantities infinitely less than itself, and so on in infinitum; this is an edifice so bold and prodigious that it is too weighty for any pretended demonstration to support because it shocks the clearest and most natural principles of human reason. But what renders the matter more extraordinary is that these seemingly absurd opinions are supported by a chain of reasoning, the clearest and mast natural, nor is it possible for us to allow premises without admitting the consequences. (553)
To respond to these abstract reasonings derived from the ideas of space and time, Hume writes:
Reason here seems to be thrown into a kind of amazement and suspense which without the suggestions of any skeptic, gives her a diffidence of herself and of the ground on which she treads. She sees a full light illuminates certain places, but that light borders upon the most profound darkness. (553)
To the second kind, Hume says, "the skeptical objections to moral evidence or to the reasonings concerning matter of fact are either popular or philosophical." And the popular objections "are derived from the natural weakess of human understanding: the contradictory opinions which have been entertained in different ages and nations; the perpetual contradiction of each particular man's opinions and sentiments with many other topics of that kind." (554) And "these principles may flourish and triumph in the schools, where it is indeed difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade and by the presence of the real objects which actuate our passions and sentiments are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke and leave the most determined skeptic in the same condition as other mortals." (554)
In part 3, Hume talks about "a more mitigated skepticism or academic philosophy which may be both durable and useful and which may, in part, be the result of this Pyrrhonism or excessive skepticism when its undistinguished doubts are in some measure corrected by common sense and reflection." (555) He says additionally, "In general, there is a degree of doubt and caution and modesty which, in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, ought forever accompany a just reasoner." And "A correct judgment observes a contrary method, and avoiding all distant and high inquiries, confines itself to common life and to such subjects as fall under daily experience..." Hume means taht this type of academic philosophy agrees with his central ideas presented in previous sections that are relevant to main ideas such as life experiences and examinations, custome and habits, causes and effects as matters of facts, etc. To defend for this type of mitigated skepticism, Hume returns to his former ideas as stated in the above sentence in the following comments:
No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction. The nonexistence of any being, without exeption, is as clear and distinct an idea as its existence. The proposition which affirms it not be, however false, is no less conceivable and intellible than that which affirms it to be. The case is different with the sciences, properly so called. Every proposition which is not true is there confused and unintelligible. That the cube rood of 64 is equal to the half of 10 is a false propostion and can never be distincly conceived. But that Caesar, or the angel Gabriel, or any being never existed may be a false proposition, but still it perfectly conceivable, and implies no contradiction. The existence, therefore, of any being can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its effect and these arguments are founded entirely on experience. If we reason a priori, anything may appear able to produce anything. The falling of a pebble may, for all we know, extinguish the sun or the wish of a man control the planets in their orbits. It is only experience which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another. (556)
Hume concludes that all moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general facts. Sciences consider general facts; the divinity or theology is composed partly of reasonings concerning particular, partly concerning general facts; even beauty whether moral or natural, is felt more properly than perceived. Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment, but all of those area that are inclined towards senses and life experiences - by his own term 'facts' - more than perceptions in the minds are what Hume stands for and trusts in order to prove for their true existence.
As I said above that Hume's central theory focuses on facts and experiences, mitigated skepticism that brings us to "so salutary a determination, nothing can be more serviceable than to be once thoroughly convinced of the force of the Pyrrhonian doubt and of the impossibility that anything but the strong power of natural instinct could free us from it." I think, Hume is right that his mitigated skepticism is an improvement over the excessive skepticism of philosophers like Descartes because as Hume says previously that: "The existence of any being can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its effect and these arguments are founded entirely on experience." And this statement is against the method of rationalism on which Descartes emphasizes as the best method over senses and impressions which Descartes thinks can put him into dreams and imaginations - the subjects that Hume are taking to be his central objects to prove for the existence of natural things.
Rerferences
Hume, David. "An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding", Modern Philosophy: An Athology of Primary Sources. Eds. Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998. 491-557.
This very table which we see white and which we feel hard is believed to exist independent of our perception and to be something external to our mind which perceives it. Our presence does not bestow being on it. Our absence does not annihilate it. Its preserves its existence uniform and entire, independent of the situation of intelligent beins who perceive or contemplate it. (551)
Of the second kind of skepticism, Hume says, there is another skeptical topic of the like nature that is derived from the most profound philosophy which - I think, he implies Berkeley's immeterialism - "might merit our attention were it requisite to dive so deep in order to discover arguments and reasonings which can so little serve to any serious purpose. It is universally allowed by modern inquirers that all the sensible qualities of objects, such as hard, soft, hot, cold, white, black, etc. are merely secondary and do not exist in the objects themselves, but are perceptions of the mind, without any external archetype or model which they represent... or can the latter be any more entitled to that denomination than the former." (552) To this skeptical topic, Hume opposes with the following comments:
Nothing can save us from this conclusion but asserting that the ideas of those primary qualities are attained by abstraction, an opinion which, if we examine it accurately, we shall find to be unintelligible and even absurd. An extension that is neither tangible nor visible cannot possibly be conceived, and a tangible or visible extension which is neither hard nor soft, black nor white, is equally beyond the reach of human conception. (552)
To give a final conclusion about these two main skepticisms. Hume writes:
The first philosophical objection to the evidence of sense or to the opinion of external existence consists in this, that such an opinion, if rested on natural instinct, is contrary to reason, if referred to reason, is contrary to natural instince and at the same time carries no rational evidence with it to convince an impartial inquirer. The second objection goes further and represents this opinion as contrary to reason, at least, if it is a principle of reason that all sensible qualities are in the mind, not in the subject. Deprive matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary, you in a manner annihilate it and leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable something as the cause of our perceptions - a notion so imperfect that no skeptic will think it worthwhile to contend against it. (553)
In part II of section 12, Hume classifies skepticisms into another two main kinds, the first kind that "is against all abstract reasoning" and the second kind that are "skeptical objections to moral evidence or to the reasonings concerning matter of fact." To the first kind, Hume says,
No priestly dogmas invented on purpose to tame and subdue the rebellious reason of mankind ever shocked common sense more than the doctrine of infinite divisibility of extension, with its consequences as they are pompously displayed by all geometers and metaphysicians with a kind of triumph and exultation. A real quantity, containing quantity, infinitely less than any finite quantity, containing quantities infinitely less than itself, and so on in infinitum; this is an edifice so bold and prodigious that it is too weighty for any pretended demonstration to support because it shocks the clearest and most natural principles of human reason. But what renders the matter more extraordinary is that these seemingly absurd opinions are supported by a chain of reasoning, the clearest and mast natural, nor is it possible for us to allow premises without admitting the consequences. (553)
To respond to these abstract reasonings derived from the ideas of space and time, Hume writes:
Reason here seems to be thrown into a kind of amazement and suspense which without the suggestions of any skeptic, gives her a diffidence of herself and of the ground on which she treads. She sees a full light illuminates certain places, but that light borders upon the most profound darkness. (553)
To the second kind, Hume says, "the skeptical objections to moral evidence or to the reasonings concerning matter of fact are either popular or philosophical." And the popular objections "are derived from the natural weakess of human understanding: the contradictory opinions which have been entertained in different ages and nations; the perpetual contradiction of each particular man's opinions and sentiments with many other topics of that kind." (554) And "these principles may flourish and triumph in the schools, where it is indeed difficult, if not impossible, to refute them. But as soon as they leave the shade and by the presence of the real objects which actuate our passions and sentiments are put in opposition to the more powerful principles of our nature, they vanish like smoke and leave the most determined skeptic in the same condition as other mortals." (554)
In part 3, Hume talks about "a more mitigated skepticism or academic philosophy which may be both durable and useful and which may, in part, be the result of this Pyrrhonism or excessive skepticism when its undistinguished doubts are in some measure corrected by common sense and reflection." (555) He says additionally, "In general, there is a degree of doubt and caution and modesty which, in all kinds of scrutiny and decision, ought forever accompany a just reasoner." And "A correct judgment observes a contrary method, and avoiding all distant and high inquiries, confines itself to common life and to such subjects as fall under daily experience..." Hume means taht this type of academic philosophy agrees with his central ideas presented in previous sections that are relevant to main ideas such as life experiences and examinations, custome and habits, causes and effects as matters of facts, etc. To defend for this type of mitigated skepticism, Hume returns to his former ideas as stated in the above sentence in the following comments:
No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction. The nonexistence of any being, without exeption, is as clear and distinct an idea as its existence. The proposition which affirms it not be, however false, is no less conceivable and intellible than that which affirms it to be. The case is different with the sciences, properly so called. Every proposition which is not true is there confused and unintelligible. That the cube rood of 64 is equal to the half of 10 is a false propostion and can never be distincly conceived. But that Caesar, or the angel Gabriel, or any being never existed may be a false proposition, but still it perfectly conceivable, and implies no contradiction. The existence, therefore, of any being can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its effect and these arguments are founded entirely on experience. If we reason a priori, anything may appear able to produce anything. The falling of a pebble may, for all we know, extinguish the sun or the wish of a man control the planets in their orbits. It is only experience which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that of another. (556)
Hume concludes that all moral reasonings are either concerning particular or general facts. Sciences consider general facts; the divinity or theology is composed partly of reasonings concerning particular, partly concerning general facts; even beauty whether moral or natural, is felt more properly than perceived. Morals and criticism are not so properly objects of the understanding as of taste and sentiment, but all of those area that are inclined towards senses and life experiences - by his own term 'facts' - more than perceptions in the minds are what Hume stands for and trusts in order to prove for their true existence.
As I said above that Hume's central theory focuses on facts and experiences, mitigated skepticism that brings us to "so salutary a determination, nothing can be more serviceable than to be once thoroughly convinced of the force of the Pyrrhonian doubt and of the impossibility that anything but the strong power of natural instinct could free us from it." I think, Hume is right that his mitigated skepticism is an improvement over the excessive skepticism of philosophers like Descartes because as Hume says previously that: "The existence of any being can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its effect and these arguments are founded entirely on experience." And this statement is against the method of rationalism on which Descartes emphasizes as the best method over senses and impressions which Descartes thinks can put him into dreams and imaginations - the subjects that Hume are taking to be his central objects to prove for the existence of natural things.
Rerferences
Hume, David. "An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding", Modern Philosophy: An Athology of Primary Sources. Eds. Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998. 491-557.
Wednesday, May 14, 2008
Plato's and Cicero's Republic
1/ Compare and contrast Socrates in Plato's Republic with Marcus in Cicero's Laws on what knowledge is needed in order to live the best kind of life and to govern well, and on why this knowledge is needed?
According to Book II of Plato's Republic, Socrates says that education is what needed to train all the citizens and the guardians in a city so that they will be good and just, and the knowledge that is acquired through this education is: wisdom, courage, moderation and justice. In Cicero's Laws, Marcus says that justice or laws and the aim at goodness are what needed in order to live the best kind of life and to govern well. He believes that justice can be found in nature and everyone should possess justice, not just the rulers:
I want it to be understood that what I call 'justice' comes from nature, but that the corruption brought by bad habits is so great that it extinguishes, so to speak, the sparks given by nature and allows the corresponding vices to spring up and flourish... For those who have been endowed by nature with reason have also been endowed with right reason, and hence, with laws, which is right reason in commanding and forbidding; but if with law, then with justice too. But reason has been bestowed on everybody; therefore the same applies to justice (The Laws, Book I, 33-34, 108)
In contrast to Socrates' ideas that justice is what everyone should do his or her own job and not to meddle with others' jobs. Marcus focuses on law and believes that in order for everyone to have happiness; however, law must be established with the government who regulates and enforces the law:
And why is it that, if a law can make what is unjust just, it cannot turn evil into good? but in fact we can distinguish a good law from a bad one solely by the criterion of nature. And not only justice and injustice are different by nature, but all things without exception that are honourable and dishonourable (The Laws, Book I, 44-45, 112)
Marcus also says that law is to keep people to aim towards goodness, and that goodness and law have the same characteristic; that is they are things for the sake of themselves, and not for the sake of other things. And goodness is the ultimate good because if something is not perfectly good then it is not ultimately good; to be ultimately good, first of all, it must be perfectly good:
To bring this whole discourse of mine to an end - the conclusion is obvious from what has been said, namely that one should strive after justice and every moral virtue for their own sake. All good men love what is fair in itself and what is right in itself. It is not in character for a good man to make the mistake of loving what is not intrinsically loveable; therefore, what is right should be sought and cultivated for itself. If this applies to justice, then the other virtues, too, should be cultivated for themselves. What about generosity? Is it free or for profit? When a person is open-handed without reward, it's free; when he's looking for a profit, it's an investment. There is no doubt that a person who is called generosity and open-handed has duty in mind, not gain. So likewise justice looks for no prize and price; it is sought for itself, and is at once the cause and meaning of all the virtue. (The Laws, Book I, 48-49, 114)
To define the ultimate good, Marcus says:
There is no doubt that, as the law should correct wickedness and promote goodness, a code of conduct may be derived from it. That is why wisdom is the mother of all good things; the love of her gives us the word 'philosophy' from the Greek. Of all the gifts which the immortal gods have bestowed on human life none is richer or more abundant or more desirable. In addition to everything else, she alone taught us this most difficult lesson, namely to know ourselves - a precept of such power and significance that is was ascribed, not to any mortal, but to the god of Delphi (The Law, Book I, 58-59, 118)
Thus, ultimate good is wisdom that helps men to live a righteous life, a justice life, including the recognition of gods and the worship of the gods:
And when the same mind examines the heavens, the earth, the sea, and the nature of things, and perceives where those things have come from and to where they will return, when and how they are due to die, what part of them is mortal and perishable, and what is divine and everlasting; and when it almost apprehends the very god who governs and rules them, and realizes that it itself is not a resident in some particular to locality surrounded by manmade walls, but a citizen of the whole world as though it were a single city; then in the majesty of these surroundings, in this contemplation and comprehension of nature, great God! How well it will know itself, as the Pythian Apollo commanded, how it will disdain, despise, and count as nothing those things that are commonly deemed so precious! (The Laws, Book I, 60, 119)
Socrates' education is to make human beings good and to aim their actions towards the searching for goodness which is also virtue and wisdom; however, Marcus' justice and law is the education that makes human beings not only good for themselves and not only to act towards virtuously and to seek wisdom, but also to recognize gods as the supreme power of all things in the world and to worship gods and to obey gods because natural law comes from divine law. In Plato's Republic, Socrates mentions only about who a philosopher is and what a philosopher does, but not about the relation between the wisdom that a philosopher seeks with the law that is a part of practicing wisdom and a part of divine law. Rather, the rulers of a city-state who have acquired the knowledge and the virtues of a philosopher will govern better their city-state, and that's all without describing what kind of law they will practice. Socrates says:
Then the philosopher, by consorting with what is ordered and divine and despite all the slanders around that say otherwise, himself becomes as divine and ordered as a human being can. That's absolutely true. And if he should come to be compelled to put what he sees there into people's characters, whether into a single person or into a populace, instead of shaping only his own, do you think that he will be a poor craftsman of moderation, justice, and whole of popular virtue? He least at all. And when the majority realize that what we are saying about the philosopher is true, will they be harsh with him or mistrust us when we say that the city will never find happiness until its outline is sketched by painters who use the divine model? (Republic, book 6, 500c-e, 174)
The difference is that the philosophers whose Socrates talks about are the guardians who rule the city, and who are well educated, but they do not rule the citizens by any knid of religious law, and they are the ones who are just but there are no concerns whether they will create law:
We hesitated to say the things we've now dared to say anyway. So let's now also dare to say that those who are to be made our guardian in the most exact sense of the term must be philosophers. (Republic, book 6, 503b, 176)
While the philosophers whose Marcus talks about are those who govern the city and create a kind of law that is called religious law which requires the citizens to respect and to follow. Some religious laws that are practiced along with justic which is the natural law. Marcus says:
I note, then, according to the opinion of the best authorities law was not thought up by the intelligence of human beings, nor is it some kind of resolution passsed by communities, but rather and eternal force which rules the world by the wisdom of its commands and prohibitions. In their judgment, that original and final law is the intelligence God, who ordains or forbids everything by reason. Hence that law which the gods have given to the human race is rightly praised, for it represents the reason and intelligence of a wise man directed to issuing commands and prohibitions. (The Laws, Book II, 8-9, 124)
And:
They shall approach the gods in purity; they shall adopt a spirit of holiness; they shall set aside wealth. God himself will punish whoever does otherwise. No one shall have gods of his own, whether new or foreign, unless they have been officially brought in. In private, they shall worship those gods whose worship has been handed down it its proper form by their forefathers... They shall worship as gods those who have always been considered divine and those whose services have secured them a place in heaven - Hercules, Liber, Aesculapius, Castor, Pollux, Quirius - and also those qualities on whose account human beings are allowed to ascend to heaven - Good sense, Moral Excellence, Devotion, Good faith. In their honor there shall be shrines, but none in honor of vices.... (The Laws, Book II, 19-20, 128-129)
2/ Does either character think that anyone has attained the knowledge he says is necessary for living well?
As I already explained at the beginning of the answer for the first question, both Socrates and Marcus think that the knowledge of wisdom and virtue is necessary for seeking the ultimate good because the ultimate good is not the physical good but the spiritual good which is the combination of wisdom and virtue. Let's compare some of the statements that Marcus says and some of the statements that Socrates says in relation to the ultimate good. Marcus:
Furthermore, if goodness is sought for its advantages, not for itself, then there will be one virtue only; and that will most properly be called selfishness. For where each person measures his actions totally by his own advantage, to that extent he totally falls short of being a good man... Finally, if goodness is pursued for the sake of other things, there must be something better than goodness. So is it money or high office or beauty or health? Such things, even when present, are not significant; and how long they are going to remain present is quite unknowable...
Quintus: In what direction, may I ask? For, as far as your talk is concerned, I would gladly run on with you.
Marcus: Towards the ultimate good, which is the standard and goal of every action...
Quintus: ...But there is no doubt about it: the highest good is either to live according to nature (i.e. to enjoy a life of moderation governed by moral excellence) or to follow nature and live, so to speak, by her law (i.e. as far as possible to omit nothing in order to achieve what nature requires, which means the same as this: to live, as it were, by the code of moral excellence.) Hence I'm inclined to think that this question [about ends] can never be decided - certainly not in our present discussion, if we are to complete what we set out to do. (The Laws, Book II, 49-57, 14-7)
For Socrates, the ultimate good is also the virtue and not only knowledge:
Socrates: And isn't this also clear? In the case of just and beautiful things, many people are content with what are believed to be so, even if they aren't really so, and they act, acquire, and form their own beliefs on that basis. Nobody is satisfied to acquire things that are merely believed to be good; however, but everyone wants the things that really are good and disdains mere belief here.
Adeimantus: That's right.
Socrates: Every soul pursues the good and does whatever it does for it sake. It divines that the good is something but it is perplexed and cannot adequately grasp what it is or acquire the sort of stable beliefs it has about other things, and so it misses the benefit, if any, that even those other things may give. Will we allow the best people in the city, to whom we entrust everything, to be so in the dark about something of this kind of this importance?....
Adeimantus: Necessarily. But, Socrates, you must also tell us whether you consider the good to be knowledge or pleasure or something else together.....
Socrates: What? Haven't you noticed that opinions without knowledge are shameful and ugly things? The best of them are blind - or do you think that those who express as true opinion without understanding are any different from blind people who happen to travel the right road?...
Adeimantus: It does seem that way.
Socrates: So that what gives truth to the things know and the power to know the knower is the form of the good. And thought it is the cause of knowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge. Both knowledge and truth are beautiful things, but the good is other and more beautiful than they. In the visible realm, light and sight are rightly considered sunlike, but it is wrong to think that they are the sun, so here it is right to think of knowledge and truth as godlike but wrong to think that either of them is the good - for the good is yet more prized... (Republic, book 6, 505d-509a, 179-182)
In book 7 of Plato's Republic, Socrates again confirms that a life of a philosopher is what all the guardians should learn to possess, and that a philosopher is the best guardian while the guardians who are not philosophers are just regular guardians who cannot best govern their city-state:
It isn't possible, for we'll be giving just orders to just people. Each of them will certainly go to rule as to something compulsory, however, which is exactly the opposite of what's done by those whose now rule in each city. This is how it is. If you can find a way of life that's better than ruling for the prospective rulers, your well-governed city will become a possibility, for only in it will the truly rich rule - not those who are rich in gold but those who are rich in the wealth that the happy must have, namely, a good and rational life...
Adeimantus: That's very true.
Socrates: Can you name any life that despises political rule besides that of the true philosophers?
Socrates: But surely it is those who are not lovers of ruling who must rule, for if they don't, the lovers of it, who are rivals, will fight over it.
Adeimantus: Of course.
Socrates: Then who will you compel to become the guardians of the city, if not those who have the best understanding of what matters for good government and who have other honors than political ones and a better life as well?
Adeimantus: No one. (Plato's Republic, book 7, 520e-521c, 192-193)
In conclusion, both Socrates and Marcus think that seeking wisdom, virtue is the life of a philosopher, and that it should be the ultimate good that the rulers aim to in order to live the best kind of life and to govern well.
Rerfercences
According to Book II of Plato's Republic, Socrates says that education is what needed to train all the citizens and the guardians in a city so that they will be good and just, and the knowledge that is acquired through this education is: wisdom, courage, moderation and justice. In Cicero's Laws, Marcus says that justice or laws and the aim at goodness are what needed in order to live the best kind of life and to govern well. He believes that justice can be found in nature and everyone should possess justice, not just the rulers:
I want it to be understood that what I call 'justice' comes from nature, but that the corruption brought by bad habits is so great that it extinguishes, so to speak, the sparks given by nature and allows the corresponding vices to spring up and flourish... For those who have been endowed by nature with reason have also been endowed with right reason, and hence, with laws, which is right reason in commanding and forbidding; but if with law, then with justice too. But reason has been bestowed on everybody; therefore the same applies to justice (The Laws, Book I, 33-34, 108)
In contrast to Socrates' ideas that justice is what everyone should do his or her own job and not to meddle with others' jobs. Marcus focuses on law and believes that in order for everyone to have happiness; however, law must be established with the government who regulates and enforces the law:
And why is it that, if a law can make what is unjust just, it cannot turn evil into good? but in fact we can distinguish a good law from a bad one solely by the criterion of nature. And not only justice and injustice are different by nature, but all things without exception that are honourable and dishonourable (The Laws, Book I, 44-45, 112)
Marcus also says that law is to keep people to aim towards goodness, and that goodness and law have the same characteristic; that is they are things for the sake of themselves, and not for the sake of other things. And goodness is the ultimate good because if something is not perfectly good then it is not ultimately good; to be ultimately good, first of all, it must be perfectly good:
To bring this whole discourse of mine to an end - the conclusion is obvious from what has been said, namely that one should strive after justice and every moral virtue for their own sake. All good men love what is fair in itself and what is right in itself. It is not in character for a good man to make the mistake of loving what is not intrinsically loveable; therefore, what is right should be sought and cultivated for itself. If this applies to justice, then the other virtues, too, should be cultivated for themselves. What about generosity? Is it free or for profit? When a person is open-handed without reward, it's free; when he's looking for a profit, it's an investment. There is no doubt that a person who is called generosity and open-handed has duty in mind, not gain. So likewise justice looks for no prize and price; it is sought for itself, and is at once the cause and meaning of all the virtue. (The Laws, Book I, 48-49, 114)
To define the ultimate good, Marcus says:
There is no doubt that, as the law should correct wickedness and promote goodness, a code of conduct may be derived from it. That is why wisdom is the mother of all good things; the love of her gives us the word 'philosophy' from the Greek. Of all the gifts which the immortal gods have bestowed on human life none is richer or more abundant or more desirable. In addition to everything else, she alone taught us this most difficult lesson, namely to know ourselves - a precept of such power and significance that is was ascribed, not to any mortal, but to the god of Delphi (The Law, Book I, 58-59, 118)
Thus, ultimate good is wisdom that helps men to live a righteous life, a justice life, including the recognition of gods and the worship of the gods:
And when the same mind examines the heavens, the earth, the sea, and the nature of things, and perceives where those things have come from and to where they will return, when and how they are due to die, what part of them is mortal and perishable, and what is divine and everlasting; and when it almost apprehends the very god who governs and rules them, and realizes that it itself is not a resident in some particular to locality surrounded by manmade walls, but a citizen of the whole world as though it were a single city; then in the majesty of these surroundings, in this contemplation and comprehension of nature, great God! How well it will know itself, as the Pythian Apollo commanded, how it will disdain, despise, and count as nothing those things that are commonly deemed so precious! (The Laws, Book I, 60, 119)
Socrates' education is to make human beings good and to aim their actions towards the searching for goodness which is also virtue and wisdom; however, Marcus' justice and law is the education that makes human beings not only good for themselves and not only to act towards virtuously and to seek wisdom, but also to recognize gods as the supreme power of all things in the world and to worship gods and to obey gods because natural law comes from divine law. In Plato's Republic, Socrates mentions only about who a philosopher is and what a philosopher does, but not about the relation between the wisdom that a philosopher seeks with the law that is a part of practicing wisdom and a part of divine law. Rather, the rulers of a city-state who have acquired the knowledge and the virtues of a philosopher will govern better their city-state, and that's all without describing what kind of law they will practice. Socrates says:
Then the philosopher, by consorting with what is ordered and divine and despite all the slanders around that say otherwise, himself becomes as divine and ordered as a human being can. That's absolutely true. And if he should come to be compelled to put what he sees there into people's characters, whether into a single person or into a populace, instead of shaping only his own, do you think that he will be a poor craftsman of moderation, justice, and whole of popular virtue? He least at all. And when the majority realize that what we are saying about the philosopher is true, will they be harsh with him or mistrust us when we say that the city will never find happiness until its outline is sketched by painters who use the divine model? (Republic, book 6, 500c-e, 174)
The difference is that the philosophers whose Socrates talks about are the guardians who rule the city, and who are well educated, but they do not rule the citizens by any knid of religious law, and they are the ones who are just but there are no concerns whether they will create law:
We hesitated to say the things we've now dared to say anyway. So let's now also dare to say that those who are to be made our guardian in the most exact sense of the term must be philosophers. (Republic, book 6, 503b, 176)
While the philosophers whose Marcus talks about are those who govern the city and create a kind of law that is called religious law which requires the citizens to respect and to follow. Some religious laws that are practiced along with justic which is the natural law. Marcus says:
I note, then, according to the opinion of the best authorities law was not thought up by the intelligence of human beings, nor is it some kind of resolution passsed by communities, but rather and eternal force which rules the world by the wisdom of its commands and prohibitions. In their judgment, that original and final law is the intelligence God, who ordains or forbids everything by reason. Hence that law which the gods have given to the human race is rightly praised, for it represents the reason and intelligence of a wise man directed to issuing commands and prohibitions. (The Laws, Book II, 8-9, 124)
And:
They shall approach the gods in purity; they shall adopt a spirit of holiness; they shall set aside wealth. God himself will punish whoever does otherwise. No one shall have gods of his own, whether new or foreign, unless they have been officially brought in. In private, they shall worship those gods whose worship has been handed down it its proper form by their forefathers... They shall worship as gods those who have always been considered divine and those whose services have secured them a place in heaven - Hercules, Liber, Aesculapius, Castor, Pollux, Quirius - and also those qualities on whose account human beings are allowed to ascend to heaven - Good sense, Moral Excellence, Devotion, Good faith. In their honor there shall be shrines, but none in honor of vices.... (The Laws, Book II, 19-20, 128-129)
2/ Does either character think that anyone has attained the knowledge he says is necessary for living well?
As I already explained at the beginning of the answer for the first question, both Socrates and Marcus think that the knowledge of wisdom and virtue is necessary for seeking the ultimate good because the ultimate good is not the physical good but the spiritual good which is the combination of wisdom and virtue. Let's compare some of the statements that Marcus says and some of the statements that Socrates says in relation to the ultimate good. Marcus:
Furthermore, if goodness is sought for its advantages, not for itself, then there will be one virtue only; and that will most properly be called selfishness. For where each person measures his actions totally by his own advantage, to that extent he totally falls short of being a good man... Finally, if goodness is pursued for the sake of other things, there must be something better than goodness. So is it money or high office or beauty or health? Such things, even when present, are not significant; and how long they are going to remain present is quite unknowable...
Quintus: In what direction, may I ask? For, as far as your talk is concerned, I would gladly run on with you.
Marcus: Towards the ultimate good, which is the standard and goal of every action...
Quintus: ...But there is no doubt about it: the highest good is either to live according to nature (i.e. to enjoy a life of moderation governed by moral excellence) or to follow nature and live, so to speak, by her law (i.e. as far as possible to omit nothing in order to achieve what nature requires, which means the same as this: to live, as it were, by the code of moral excellence.) Hence I'm inclined to think that this question [about ends] can never be decided - certainly not in our present discussion, if we are to complete what we set out to do. (The Laws, Book II, 49-57, 14-7)
For Socrates, the ultimate good is also the virtue and not only knowledge:
Socrates: And isn't this also clear? In the case of just and beautiful things, many people are content with what are believed to be so, even if they aren't really so, and they act, acquire, and form their own beliefs on that basis. Nobody is satisfied to acquire things that are merely believed to be good; however, but everyone wants the things that really are good and disdains mere belief here.
Adeimantus: That's right.
Socrates: Every soul pursues the good and does whatever it does for it sake. It divines that the good is something but it is perplexed and cannot adequately grasp what it is or acquire the sort of stable beliefs it has about other things, and so it misses the benefit, if any, that even those other things may give. Will we allow the best people in the city, to whom we entrust everything, to be so in the dark about something of this kind of this importance?....
Adeimantus: Necessarily. But, Socrates, you must also tell us whether you consider the good to be knowledge or pleasure or something else together.....
Socrates: What? Haven't you noticed that opinions without knowledge are shameful and ugly things? The best of them are blind - or do you think that those who express as true opinion without understanding are any different from blind people who happen to travel the right road?...
Adeimantus: It does seem that way.
Socrates: So that what gives truth to the things know and the power to know the knower is the form of the good. And thought it is the cause of knowledge and truth, it is also an object of knowledge. Both knowledge and truth are beautiful things, but the good is other and more beautiful than they. In the visible realm, light and sight are rightly considered sunlike, but it is wrong to think that they are the sun, so here it is right to think of knowledge and truth as godlike but wrong to think that either of them is the good - for the good is yet more prized... (Republic, book 6, 505d-509a, 179-182)
In book 7 of Plato's Republic, Socrates again confirms that a life of a philosopher is what all the guardians should learn to possess, and that a philosopher is the best guardian while the guardians who are not philosophers are just regular guardians who cannot best govern their city-state:
It isn't possible, for we'll be giving just orders to just people. Each of them will certainly go to rule as to something compulsory, however, which is exactly the opposite of what's done by those whose now rule in each city. This is how it is. If you can find a way of life that's better than ruling for the prospective rulers, your well-governed city will become a possibility, for only in it will the truly rich rule - not those who are rich in gold but those who are rich in the wealth that the happy must have, namely, a good and rational life...
Adeimantus: That's very true.
Socrates: Can you name any life that despises political rule besides that of the true philosophers?
Socrates: But surely it is those who are not lovers of ruling who must rule, for if they don't, the lovers of it, who are rivals, will fight over it.
Adeimantus: Of course.
Socrates: Then who will you compel to become the guardians of the city, if not those who have the best understanding of what matters for good government and who have other honors than political ones and a better life as well?
Adeimantus: No one. (Plato's Republic, book 7, 520e-521c, 192-193)
In conclusion, both Socrates and Marcus think that seeking wisdom, virtue is the life of a philosopher, and that it should be the ultimate good that the rulers aim to in order to live the best kind of life and to govern well.
Rerfercences
Cicero. The Republic and the Laws. Trans. Niall Rudd. New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1998.
Plato. Republic. Trans. G.M.A. Grube. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992.
Tuesday, May 13, 2008
Leibniz's Rejection of Voluntarism
Unlike Descartes who takes a belief in God through his subjective thinking that God is a perfect and that God as a perfect divine being has influenced Descartes' mind and caused him to have a perfect idea of God, Leibniz takes his belief in God more in the things in the universe and around himself as well as in the Sacred Scripture to prove for the perfect of God as he said in the following paragraph in Discourse of Metaphysics:
For I am far removed from the opinion of those who maintain that there are no rules of goodness and perfection in the nature of things or in the ideas of God has of them and who say that the works of God are good solely for the formal reason that God has made them. For if this were so, God, knowing that he is their author, would not have had to consider them afterwards and find them good, as is testified by the Sacred Scripture - which seem to have used such anthropomorphic expressions only to make us understand that the excellent of God's works can be recognized by considering them in themselves even when we do not reflect them to their cause. This is all the more true, since it is by considering his works that we can discover the creator. (185)
Thus, we see that by looking at things in the universe that God created, from inanimate beings to human beings, Leibniz can discover that their creator is God. In paragraph 3, Leibniz again confirms his confidence in God by saying that the opinion of "those who believed that God might have made things better" Is contrary to the Sacred Scripture "which assures us of the goodness of God's work." And he continues to say:
For, if their view were sufficient, then since the series of imperfections descends to infinity, God's works would always have been good in comparison with those less perfect, no matter how he created them, but something is hardly praiseworthy if it can be praised only in this way. I also believe that a great many passages from Sacred Scripture and the holy fathers will be found favoring my opinion, but scarcely any will be found favoring the opinion of these moderns, an opinion which is, in my judgment, unknown to all antiquity and which is based only on the inadequate knowledge we have of the general harmony of the universe and of the hidden reasons for God's conduct (185)
Through the above paragraph, I see that Leibniz doesn't believe in modern opinions that are unknown to all antiquity or to all the known facts about God that were told earlier in the Sacred Scripture, the Bible. Leibniz believed in the stories of the Bible about many things that God had said to the ancestors of the people on earth, had taught them his righteous gospel and had used reasoning when talking to these ancestors. I know that Leibniz believes that God is a fair and righteous being because God has shown that he was against inequality among the groups of the people on earth. Thus, Leibniz believes that God is a reasoning super being who love all the creatures that he created including humankind and whose perfection no one can compare with. To prove that God is a perfect divine being, Leibniz rejects Descartes' idea of God's voluntarism and claims that,
For to believe that God does something without having any reason for his will -- is an opinion that conforms to little to his glory. Let us assume, for example, that God chooses between A and B and that he takes A withoug having any reason to prefer it to B. I say that this action of God is at the very least praiseworthy; for all praise must be based on some reason, and by hypothesis there is none here. Instead I hold that God does nothing for which he does not deserve to be glorified. (186)
What he means by the above paragraph is that God has a reason or a will to do things, and that since God was perfect and has done perfect things, he did not do those things by arbitrary actions but with care and reasoning and a good will. Thus, Leibniz says that we, as human beings, should follow God's way and do things with care and reasoning as well as putting our wills in our actions. Leibniz says, "that the love of God requires our complete satisfaction and acquiescence with respect to what he has done without our being quietists as a result." (186) Leibniz also says, "And I believe that it is difficult to love God well when we are not disposed to will what God wills, when we might have the power to change it." (186) What Leibniz means is that since God loves us, he always wants to do things that are good and perfect for us, and everything that God does, he plans it or have a will to do it in the best way he can. Thus, I see that Leibniz doesn't believe in arbitration, but rather in will and intention. Leibniz says,
For, although the outcome might perhaps demonstrate that God did not wish our good will to have effect at present, it does not follow that he did not wish us to act as we have. On the contrary, since he is the best of all masters, he never demands more than the right intention, and it is for him to know the proper hour and place for letting designs succeed. (186)
Leibniz' key claims are:
1) On divine perfection, and that God does everything in the most desirable way:
We must also know what a perfection is. A fairly sure test for being a perfection is that forms or natures that are not capable of a highest degree are not perfections, as for example, the nature of number or figure. For the greatest of all numbers (or even the number of all numbers), as well as the greatest of all figures, imply a contradiction, but the greatest knowledge and omnipotence do not involve any impossibility. (184)
2) Leibniz is against those who claims that there is no goodness in God's works, or that the rules of goodness and beauty are arbitrary:
I confess that the contrary opinion seems to me extremely dangerous and very near to the opinion of the recent innovators who hold that the beauty of the universe and the goodness we attribute to the works of God are but the chimeras of those who conceive of God in terms of themselves. Thus, in saying that things are not good by virtue of any rule of goodness but solely by virtue of the will of God, it seems to me that we unknowingly destroy all of God's love and all his glory. (184)
3) Leibniz is against those who believe that God might have made things better:
Nor can I approve of the opinion of some moderns who maintain boldly that what God has made is not of the highest perfection and that he could have done much better. For it seems to me that the consequences of this opinion are wholly contrary to the glory of God. As a lesser evil is relatively good, so a lesser good is relatively evil. And to act with less perfection than one could have is to act imperfectly. (184)
4) What rules of the perfection of divine conduct consist in, and that the simplicity of the ways is in balance with the richness of the effects:
We can therefore say that one who acts perfectly is similar to an excellent geometer who can find the best constructions for a problem; or to a good architect who makes use of his location and the funds set aside for a building in the most advantageous manner.... That is why we mustn't doubt that the happiness of minds is the principal aim of God and that he puts this into practice to the the extent that general harmony permits it. (186)
5) God does nothing which is not orderly and it is not even possible to imagine events that are not regular:
The volitions or acts of God are commonly divided into ordinary and extraordinary. But it is good to consider that God does nothing which is not orderly. Thus, what passes for extraordinary is extraordinary only with some particular order established among creatures; for everything is in conformity with respect to the universal order. This is true to such as extent that not only does nothing completely irregular occur in the world, but we would not even be able to imagine such a thing. (187)
Descartes also has some ideas that are like Leibniz's rejection of voluntarism because Descartes asserts that the mind is free while the body is controlled by natural laws. Thus, the free mind can do whatever the will wants to do; in other words, the will controls the mind or instructs the mind to plan things, to use reasoning in order to achieve what the will wishes. The minds, according to Descartes can transcend the body, and be a slave for the will. Similarly, Leibniz thinks that God uses his will to know what God wants and then uses his mind to plan things, to reason and to create a perfect world in which we are living our lives. In Meditation 4, Descartes discusses that human minds are the possessions of free wills like God, and it is more important that we are most free when we are making choices according to the knowledge provided by the understanding. Thus, according to Descartes, we become freer, more like God, as we acquire more knowledge. Indeed, if we had God's knowledge, we would never have to worry about making a wrong choice, that is sinning. And as we acquire knowledge, we become more and more independent of our bodies. The similarity between Leibniz and Descartes is that they both believe in the power of the mind and the will as the headquarter that controls the mind. They both believe that reasoning, and making choice allow us to be more like God because God uses his will and his intelligent mind to create a perfect universe. One difference between Leibniz and Descartes is Leibniz's account of the nature of individual substances or monads:
Monads are psychological entities which are hierarchically organized. Extension is, on Leibniz's account, relative to our perception and not a fundamental attribute of real things. Leibniz's reason for claiming that monads must be conceived of as rather like souls is that extension is inconsistent with simplicity and unity. Anything which is extended, which takes up space, must have parts; and since monads are simples - atoms - they cannot be extended. Thus, extension, one of Descartes' two sorts of substances is banished from Leibniz's universe. (Scott-Kakures 159)
Leibniz's rejection of voluntarism causes him to explain the notion of individual substance which is called a monad which is mentioned in the above paragraph. In his Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz claims the following sentences about the individual substance:
And since actions and passions properly belong to individual substances, it will be necessary to explain what such an individual substance is. It is indeed true that when several predicates are attributed to a single subject and this subject is attributed to no other, it is called an individual substance... Not it is evident that all true predication has some basis in the nature of things and that, when a proportion is not an identity, that is, when the predicate is not explicitly contained in the subject, it must be contained in it virtually... Thus, the subject term must always contain the predicate term, so that one who understands perfectly the notion of the subject would also know that the predicate belongs to it. (188)
Each individual substance is in harmony, pre-established by God, with other individual substances so that each individual will fit into an arrangement with every other individual substance:
Now, first of all, it is very evident that created substances depend upon God, who preserves them continually by a kind of emanation, just as we produce our thoughts... Nevertheless, it is very true that the perceptions or expressions of all substances mutually correspond in such a way that each one, carefully following certain reasons or laws it has observed, coincides with others doing the same... And God alone is the cause of this correspondence of their phenomena and makes that which is particular to one of them public to all of them; otherwise, there would be no inerconnection. (192)
Finally, for the question: Is leibniz's view of God's nature more or less problematic than Descartes? I would answer that his view is more problematic than Descartes' view because he doesn't account on the mind-body problem as Descartes does for his mind-body interaction (the mind appears to act upon the body and the body upon the mind), and for Leibniz, all substances are to be understood as mental sustances; there are, as a matter of fact, no extended substances. Leibniz' account on the mind-body is the following: it is crucial to see that this is no longer the mind-body problem, as it is traditionally conceived. For example, the will acts upon the body in such a way as to raise the arm. For Leibniz, a priori reason which constitutes the raise of the arm is to be found in the state of the soul:
... as long as we recognize that all contingent propositions have reasons to be one way rather than another or else (what comes to the same thing) that they have a priori proofs of their truth which render them certain and which show that the connection between subject and predicate of these propositions has its basis in the nature of both. (191-192)
Leibniz later develops ways of reasoning such necessary and sufficient conditions and other important concepts related to individual substances, and of course, his views of the soul, the mind, of freedom and the will of God construct more systematic concepts than Descartes' views regarding these matters.
Works Cited
Leibniz, G. W. "Discourse on Metaphysics". Modern Philosophy: An Anthology of Primary Sources. Eds Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998. 184-207.
Scott-Kakures at al. Eds. History of Philosophy. New York: HaperCollins Publishers, 1993.
For I am far removed from the opinion of those who maintain that there are no rules of goodness and perfection in the nature of things or in the ideas of God has of them and who say that the works of God are good solely for the formal reason that God has made them. For if this were so, God, knowing that he is their author, would not have had to consider them afterwards and find them good, as is testified by the Sacred Scripture - which seem to have used such anthropomorphic expressions only to make us understand that the excellent of God's works can be recognized by considering them in themselves even when we do not reflect them to their cause. This is all the more true, since it is by considering his works that we can discover the creator. (185)
Thus, we see that by looking at things in the universe that God created, from inanimate beings to human beings, Leibniz can discover that their creator is God. In paragraph 3, Leibniz again confirms his confidence in God by saying that the opinion of "those who believed that God might have made things better" Is contrary to the Sacred Scripture "which assures us of the goodness of God's work." And he continues to say:
For, if their view were sufficient, then since the series of imperfections descends to infinity, God's works would always have been good in comparison with those less perfect, no matter how he created them, but something is hardly praiseworthy if it can be praised only in this way. I also believe that a great many passages from Sacred Scripture and the holy fathers will be found favoring my opinion, but scarcely any will be found favoring the opinion of these moderns, an opinion which is, in my judgment, unknown to all antiquity and which is based only on the inadequate knowledge we have of the general harmony of the universe and of the hidden reasons for God's conduct (185)
Through the above paragraph, I see that Leibniz doesn't believe in modern opinions that are unknown to all antiquity or to all the known facts about God that were told earlier in the Sacred Scripture, the Bible. Leibniz believed in the stories of the Bible about many things that God had said to the ancestors of the people on earth, had taught them his righteous gospel and had used reasoning when talking to these ancestors. I know that Leibniz believes that God is a fair and righteous being because God has shown that he was against inequality among the groups of the people on earth. Thus, Leibniz believes that God is a reasoning super being who love all the creatures that he created including humankind and whose perfection no one can compare with. To prove that God is a perfect divine being, Leibniz rejects Descartes' idea of God's voluntarism and claims that,
For to believe that God does something without having any reason for his will -- is an opinion that conforms to little to his glory. Let us assume, for example, that God chooses between A and B and that he takes A withoug having any reason to prefer it to B. I say that this action of God is at the very least praiseworthy; for all praise must be based on some reason, and by hypothesis there is none here. Instead I hold that God does nothing for which he does not deserve to be glorified. (186)
What he means by the above paragraph is that God has a reason or a will to do things, and that since God was perfect and has done perfect things, he did not do those things by arbitrary actions but with care and reasoning and a good will. Thus, Leibniz says that we, as human beings, should follow God's way and do things with care and reasoning as well as putting our wills in our actions. Leibniz says, "that the love of God requires our complete satisfaction and acquiescence with respect to what he has done without our being quietists as a result." (186) Leibniz also says, "And I believe that it is difficult to love God well when we are not disposed to will what God wills, when we might have the power to change it." (186) What Leibniz means is that since God loves us, he always wants to do things that are good and perfect for us, and everything that God does, he plans it or have a will to do it in the best way he can. Thus, I see that Leibniz doesn't believe in arbitration, but rather in will and intention. Leibniz says,
For, although the outcome might perhaps demonstrate that God did not wish our good will to have effect at present, it does not follow that he did not wish us to act as we have. On the contrary, since he is the best of all masters, he never demands more than the right intention, and it is for him to know the proper hour and place for letting designs succeed. (186)
Leibniz' key claims are:
1) On divine perfection, and that God does everything in the most desirable way:
We must also know what a perfection is. A fairly sure test for being a perfection is that forms or natures that are not capable of a highest degree are not perfections, as for example, the nature of number or figure. For the greatest of all numbers (or even the number of all numbers), as well as the greatest of all figures, imply a contradiction, but the greatest knowledge and omnipotence do not involve any impossibility. (184)
2) Leibniz is against those who claims that there is no goodness in God's works, or that the rules of goodness and beauty are arbitrary:
I confess that the contrary opinion seems to me extremely dangerous and very near to the opinion of the recent innovators who hold that the beauty of the universe and the goodness we attribute to the works of God are but the chimeras of those who conceive of God in terms of themselves. Thus, in saying that things are not good by virtue of any rule of goodness but solely by virtue of the will of God, it seems to me that we unknowingly destroy all of God's love and all his glory. (184)
3) Leibniz is against those who believe that God might have made things better:
Nor can I approve of the opinion of some moderns who maintain boldly that what God has made is not of the highest perfection and that he could have done much better. For it seems to me that the consequences of this opinion are wholly contrary to the glory of God. As a lesser evil is relatively good, so a lesser good is relatively evil. And to act with less perfection than one could have is to act imperfectly. (184)
4) What rules of the perfection of divine conduct consist in, and that the simplicity of the ways is in balance with the richness of the effects:
We can therefore say that one who acts perfectly is similar to an excellent geometer who can find the best constructions for a problem; or to a good architect who makes use of his location and the funds set aside for a building in the most advantageous manner.... That is why we mustn't doubt that the happiness of minds is the principal aim of God and that he puts this into practice to the the extent that general harmony permits it. (186)
5) God does nothing which is not orderly and it is not even possible to imagine events that are not regular:
The volitions or acts of God are commonly divided into ordinary and extraordinary. But it is good to consider that God does nothing which is not orderly. Thus, what passes for extraordinary is extraordinary only with some particular order established among creatures; for everything is in conformity with respect to the universal order. This is true to such as extent that not only does nothing completely irregular occur in the world, but we would not even be able to imagine such a thing. (187)
Descartes also has some ideas that are like Leibniz's rejection of voluntarism because Descartes asserts that the mind is free while the body is controlled by natural laws. Thus, the free mind can do whatever the will wants to do; in other words, the will controls the mind or instructs the mind to plan things, to use reasoning in order to achieve what the will wishes. The minds, according to Descartes can transcend the body, and be a slave for the will. Similarly, Leibniz thinks that God uses his will to know what God wants and then uses his mind to plan things, to reason and to create a perfect world in which we are living our lives. In Meditation 4, Descartes discusses that human minds are the possessions of free wills like God, and it is more important that we are most free when we are making choices according to the knowledge provided by the understanding. Thus, according to Descartes, we become freer, more like God, as we acquire more knowledge. Indeed, if we had God's knowledge, we would never have to worry about making a wrong choice, that is sinning. And as we acquire knowledge, we become more and more independent of our bodies. The similarity between Leibniz and Descartes is that they both believe in the power of the mind and the will as the headquarter that controls the mind. They both believe that reasoning, and making choice allow us to be more like God because God uses his will and his intelligent mind to create a perfect universe. One difference between Leibniz and Descartes is Leibniz's account of the nature of individual substances or monads:
Monads are psychological entities which are hierarchically organized. Extension is, on Leibniz's account, relative to our perception and not a fundamental attribute of real things. Leibniz's reason for claiming that monads must be conceived of as rather like souls is that extension is inconsistent with simplicity and unity. Anything which is extended, which takes up space, must have parts; and since monads are simples - atoms - they cannot be extended. Thus, extension, one of Descartes' two sorts of substances is banished from Leibniz's universe. (Scott-Kakures 159)
Leibniz's rejection of voluntarism causes him to explain the notion of individual substance which is called a monad which is mentioned in the above paragraph. In his Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz claims the following sentences about the individual substance:
And since actions and passions properly belong to individual substances, it will be necessary to explain what such an individual substance is. It is indeed true that when several predicates are attributed to a single subject and this subject is attributed to no other, it is called an individual substance... Not it is evident that all true predication has some basis in the nature of things and that, when a proportion is not an identity, that is, when the predicate is not explicitly contained in the subject, it must be contained in it virtually... Thus, the subject term must always contain the predicate term, so that one who understands perfectly the notion of the subject would also know that the predicate belongs to it. (188)
Each individual substance is in harmony, pre-established by God, with other individual substances so that each individual will fit into an arrangement with every other individual substance:
Now, first of all, it is very evident that created substances depend upon God, who preserves them continually by a kind of emanation, just as we produce our thoughts... Nevertheless, it is very true that the perceptions or expressions of all substances mutually correspond in such a way that each one, carefully following certain reasons or laws it has observed, coincides with others doing the same... And God alone is the cause of this correspondence of their phenomena and makes that which is particular to one of them public to all of them; otherwise, there would be no inerconnection. (192)
Finally, for the question: Is leibniz's view of God's nature more or less problematic than Descartes? I would answer that his view is more problematic than Descartes' view because he doesn't account on the mind-body problem as Descartes does for his mind-body interaction (the mind appears to act upon the body and the body upon the mind), and for Leibniz, all substances are to be understood as mental sustances; there are, as a matter of fact, no extended substances. Leibniz' account on the mind-body is the following: it is crucial to see that this is no longer the mind-body problem, as it is traditionally conceived. For example, the will acts upon the body in such a way as to raise the arm. For Leibniz, a priori reason which constitutes the raise of the arm is to be found in the state of the soul:
... as long as we recognize that all contingent propositions have reasons to be one way rather than another or else (what comes to the same thing) that they have a priori proofs of their truth which render them certain and which show that the connection between subject and predicate of these propositions has its basis in the nature of both. (191-192)
Leibniz later develops ways of reasoning such necessary and sufficient conditions and other important concepts related to individual substances, and of course, his views of the soul, the mind, of freedom and the will of God construct more systematic concepts than Descartes' views regarding these matters.
Works Cited
Leibniz, G. W. "Discourse on Metaphysics". Modern Philosophy: An Anthology of Primary Sources. Eds Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998. 184-207.
Scott-Kakures at al. Eds. History of Philosophy. New York: HaperCollins Publishers, 1993.
Thursday, May 1, 2008
Freedom - Determination and Free Will
Freedom is one of the most important concepts which many philosophers devoted times to study and to find definitions revolving it. One of the theories that has a strong relation to it is named determinism; another aspect that has no less important relation to it is called free will. In the following paragraphs, I will show some of the most interesting statements and thoughts regarding determinism and free will that are written and expressed by famous philosophers such as Augustine, Aquinas, Hume, Leibniz and Susan Wolf. In addition, I will also present my own thoughts about these two matters as whether we can have freedom without free will , and whether we can have freedom with free will?
First of all, I will consider what Augustine says about free will in his excerpt of On Free Choice of the Will. Augustine presents the discussion about free will in form of a dialogue between himself and Evodius, and throughout this dialogue, he argues with Evodius about what meaning of free will that he thinks should be. Evodius ask Augustine:
Evodius: Now explain to me, if you can, why God gave human beings free choice of the will, since if we had not received it, we would not have been able to sin.
Agustine replies: If all of this is true, the question you posed has clearly been answered. If human beings are good things, and they cannot do right unless they so will, then they ought to have a free will, without which they cannot do right. True, they can also use free will to sin, but we should not therefore believe that God gave them free will so that they would be able to sin. The fact that human beings could not live rightly without it was sufficient reason for God to give it. The very fact that anyone who uses free will to sin is devinely punished shows that free will was given to enable human beings to live rightly, for such punishment would be unjust if free will had been given both for living rightly and for sinning. ( Pereboom 20)
Thus, we see that free will by God means that human beings should choose the right things to do and should not do wrong things because if God doesn't give us free will, he cannot punish us if we do wrong things. However, that is a divine concept which is explained clearly by Augustine; for Aquinas, free will is something more humanly and earthly because Aquinas thinks that human beings are prone toward errors and sins as a result of the sin that Eva had committed before the earth had its first couple to live on. In Summa Theologica, Aquinas presents his own thoughts about free will in the same format that he uses to write his Treatise on Law which contains statements of objections and then statements of replies. Aqinas thinks that free will and free choices are the same and that they are the powers of selection:
On the contrary, Damascene says free choice is nothing else than the will.
I answer that, the appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above. Now, as on the part of intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite we have will and free choice, which is nothing else but the power of election... But to reason, properly speaking, is to come from one thing to knowledge of another, and so, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like manner, on the part of appetite, to will implies the simple appetite for something, and so the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to elect is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else, and so, properly speaking, it regards the means to end... Therefore it is evident that as intellect is to reason, so will is to the elective power, which is free choice. ( Pereboom 40)
Thus, we see that human beings have power to will or to choose according to Aquinas. Next, Aquinas says that voluntary is in human acts and that voluntary is an act consisting in a rational operation. He writes:
First of all, I will consider what Augustine says about free will in his excerpt of On Free Choice of the Will. Augustine presents the discussion about free will in form of a dialogue between himself and Evodius, and throughout this dialogue, he argues with Evodius about what meaning of free will that he thinks should be. Evodius ask Augustine:
Evodius: Now explain to me, if you can, why God gave human beings free choice of the will, since if we had not received it, we would not have been able to sin.
Agustine replies: If all of this is true, the question you posed has clearly been answered. If human beings are good things, and they cannot do right unless they so will, then they ought to have a free will, without which they cannot do right. True, they can also use free will to sin, but we should not therefore believe that God gave them free will so that they would be able to sin. The fact that human beings could not live rightly without it was sufficient reason for God to give it. The very fact that anyone who uses free will to sin is devinely punished shows that free will was given to enable human beings to live rightly, for such punishment would be unjust if free will had been given both for living rightly and for sinning. ( Pereboom 20)
Thus, we see that free will by God means that human beings should choose the right things to do and should not do wrong things because if God doesn't give us free will, he cannot punish us if we do wrong things. However, that is a divine concept which is explained clearly by Augustine; for Aquinas, free will is something more humanly and earthly because Aquinas thinks that human beings are prone toward errors and sins as a result of the sin that Eva had committed before the earth had its first couple to live on. In Summa Theologica, Aquinas presents his own thoughts about free will in the same format that he uses to write his Treatise on Law which contains statements of objections and then statements of replies. Aqinas thinks that free will and free choices are the same and that they are the powers of selection:
On the contrary, Damascene says free choice is nothing else than the will.
I answer that, the appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above. Now, as on the part of intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite we have will and free choice, which is nothing else but the power of election... But to reason, properly speaking, is to come from one thing to knowledge of another, and so, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like manner, on the part of appetite, to will implies the simple appetite for something, and so the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to elect is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else, and so, properly speaking, it regards the means to end... Therefore it is evident that as intellect is to reason, so will is to the elective power, which is free choice. ( Pereboom 40)
Thus, we see that human beings have power to will or to choose according to Aquinas. Next, Aquinas says that voluntary is in human acts and that voluntary is an act consisting in a rational operation. He writes:
On the contrary, Damascene says that the voluntary is an act consisting in a rational operation. Now such are human acts. Therefore there is something voluntary in human acts.
I answer that, there must needs be something voluntary in human acts. In order to make this clear, we must take note that the principle of some acts is within agent, or in that which is moved; whereas the principles of some movements or acts is outside... (Pereboom 43)
God moves man to act, not only by proposing the appetiable to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but also moving the will itself; for every movement both of the will and of nature proceeds from God as the First Mover... (Pereboom 45)
So, we see that when we will to do something, God preserves his part in it; however, to do something wrong is sometimes our own fault because to err is human. Aquinas is the philosophyer who sees the distinction between the will and the intellect as lying in their different relationship with the soul. This brings us to the question how the will is related to the intellect. Aquinas' argument is as follows:
It is in the nature of the will to tend toward the good because the good is desirable, or rather is the object of the will. Insofar as the good is the object of the will, it is the object of the mind in the second sense as distinguished by Aquinas above. (Kaphagawani 16)
Thus, another matter and another term is created regarding freedom and choice; that is Determinism in which Leibniz has difficulty making sense of the possibility of human freedom:
This difficulty is in many ways just a version of the old problem of reconciling God's foreknowledge of future events with human freedom. Leibniz realizes these worries in a discussion of Juda's free act to betray Jesus. Of such human decisions Leibniz wants to argue that God inclines our souls without at all necessiating them. Much of Leibniz's point here is that God has made it the case that human beings choose in accord with what we might term 'the law of practical reason': Human beings always choose the apparent good. So what human beings must do is to be on guard against appearances; we must decide or act only after mature deliberation. But given Leibniz's views about the nature of God's choice of the best, whatever decision Judas makes has 'been assured from all eternity.' (Scott-Kakures 156)
Thus, what we do, there seems to be something inside us that determines us to do so with the power of God according to Leibniz. Moreover, recent philosophers do not think about God as a cause of human actions as ancient philosophers did. One of these philosophers is Dr. Spakovsky. More about determinism, Dr. Spakovsky, in his book which is titled Freedom-Determinism, Indeterminism, writes the following paragraph:
This freedom of choice does not mean that this personal choice has no reason or cause. Every free personal choice has its reason and its cause, but they lie in man himself, in his bio-psychical structure and not outside the man, not in his social and cosmic environment. In other words, the difference between a free and an unfree choice is not that a free choice lies outside the character of determination, outside every law of causation, but in the character of determination. All in the universe is determined, and the term 'indeterminism' indicates only that the realization of the given phenomenon or event was on the ground of a free choice among different existential possibilities, i.e., the existence of the given phenomenon or event was not absolutely necessary but only relatively;... (Spakovsky 1)
Thus, we see that Spakovsky uses the term 'bio-psychical structure' to claim as the place where free personal choice lies in. Another philosopher is Hume who thinks that free will is compatible with determinism. We seem to act freely, that is, to determine our own actions, and hence, to be responsible for them. "However, the scientific view of the natural world is that all events are determined. So if we believe determinism is true in the natural world because there is regularity in the relations of events, then we have every reason to think the determinism is true with human behavior as well, for human behavior is just as regular. Indeed, we could have developed our idea of cause from observing the regularity in human behavior even if we had never observed constant conjunctions of events in the material world." (Scott-Kakures 224).
But in my own opinions, our liberty has external constraints such as hereditary, social, political, physiological factors. For example, we may want to fly to the moon on our own power, but we cannot, or we want to eat many fatty foods but we are too fat or overweight, etc. No matter how hard we try, there are external circumstances that will prevent us from doing so, and some of the constrainsts belong to natural law such as in the above example. Thus, liberty is not incompatible with being determined because we are determined by natural laws to do only what we are inclined to do.
Susan Wolf thinks that there is no compatibility between free will and psychological determinism because "Many people believe that if psychological determinism is true, the condition of freedom can never be satified... They therefore conclude that the condition of freedom requires the absence of psychological determinism. And they think this is what we mean to express when we state the condition of freedom in terms of the requirement that the agent 'could have done otherwise'." (Pereboom 200)
She thinks that if a person who does a right action then according to the phrase "could have done otherwise", he or she could have done a bad action instead, or that if a person who does a wrong action then he or she could have done a good action instead. If it is so, then how can we know whether a person should do a good or a bad action if anything he or she does turns out that she or he can do the other opposite action instead? And that is why she thinks that a person is not causally determined at all. The following paragraphs are written by her:
If an agent performs a morally bad action, on the other hand, then his actions can't be determined in the appropriate way. So if an agent is ever to be responsible for a bad action, it must be the case that his action is not psychological determined at all. According to my view, then, in oder for both moral praise and moral blame to be justified, the thesis of psychological determinism must be false. (Pereboom 210)
There is, admittedly, some difficulty in establishing that an agent who performs a morally bad action satisfies the condition of freedom. It is hard to know whether an agent who did one thing could have done another instead... It should be emphasized that the indetermination with which we are here concerned is indetermination at other levels of explanation... the nature of psychological explanation of our behavior cannot be relevant to the problem of free will.
I have suggested that the explanation for why a responsible agent performs a morally bad action must be, at some level, incomplete. There must be nothing that made the agent perform the action he did, nothing prevented him from performing a morally better one. It should be noted that there may be praiseworthy actions for which the explanations are similarly incomplete. For the idea that an agent who could have performed a morally bad action actually performs a morally good one is no less plausible than the idea that an agent who could have performed a morally good action actually performs a morally bad one. (Pereboom 212)
To answer the questions that I stated in the introduction about whether we can have a free will with having freedom and whether we can have a free will without having freedom, I think the first answer is that we can have a freedom but we cannot have a free will, or that we can have freedom without a free will. The reason is that, for example, in our society, America, polygamy is prohibited; thus, if a man who wants to have a free will as to marry two wives at the same time, he won't be able to do it legally. Hence, depending on the culture and the norms or the rules of a society, freedom is defined by that own culture and society, and there are many different cultures and societies; thus, there are different definitions or conceptions of freedom. And since free will is more inclined towards an individual will, it is probably that one who lives in a particular society can have freedom enacted by that particular society, but cannot have his own free will. In another word, a person can have freedom without free will, or cannot have free will with freedom.
The second answer is that if a person has free wills then of course, he or she will have freedom, and this freedom is an absolute freedom or the kind of freedom that harmonizes with her free wills. Thus, we can generally say that to have free wills is to have freedom, but to have freedom is not to have free wills as I already explained in the above paragraph. And this is, for example, in America, freedom is to do anything but not to legally being married with two people at the same time. And it is definitely that in a society, we can have freedom based on the laws, or the beliefs or the norms of that society only and our own free wills, such as polygamy will be opposite and violate with the freedom that we have. Thus, if we have a free will to marry two people at the same time legally without any restriction of freedom in society, then we have total freedom.
Works Cited
Kaphagawani, Didier. Leibniz of Freedom and Determinism in Relation to Aquinas and Molina. Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1999.
Pereboom, Derek. Free Will. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1997.
Scott-Kakures, et al. History of Philosophy. New York: HarperCollins College Outline, HarperCollins Publisher, 1993.
Spakovsky, Anatol. Freedom - Determinism Indeterminism. Netherlands: The Hague Co., 1963.
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