Hume's Empiricism

A/ Why does Hume think that there is no evidence of real causal power or "necessary connection"?



The reason why Hume think that there is no evidence or necessary connection between two events comes from the idea that sensory experiences or matters of fact account for the cause and effects. Hume has an idea to classify the objects for human reason into two kinds: Relation of Ideas and Matters of Fact. The example of the first kind is the sciences of mathematics that use reasoning to support, but for the second kind, Hume says: "Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same manner;" and "all reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect." In addition, Hume writes: "the knowledge of this relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasoning a priori; but arises entirely from experience." (An Enquiry, Section IV, part I). What he means is that reason solely cannot guarantee what will happen in an event. For example, in the billiard game, if ball A hits a cluster of other balls, the tracks that other balls move will be different each time ball A hits them. There may be a repetition of some tracks but not all will happen in the same manner. Only by observation or using sensory experience, one can predict what will happen next or will happen in the future. Moreover, Hume emphasizes on the connection between the events, for example, ball A strikes ball B, and ball B moves. Now, can we say that ball B would not have moved if ball A had not struck it? The answer is no because may be another ball, for example, ball C, can hit ball B and causes ball B to move. So, it is not necessary that ball A must push ball B in order for ball B to move because it could be that another ball, or ball C, would push ball B. So, by only reasoning, we cannot determine the cause and effect relation. Rather, this relation is a result of our impression that is our own belief based on our experience that previously showed that relation.

Hume's idea is different from Descartes' idea that reasoning can guarantee for checking the truth. Descartes thinks that relations of ideas which form mathematical or scientific laws are the true method because there are proofs for the involment of logically plausible reasoning. But Hume thinks that only sensory experience or matters of fact can account for any cause-and-effect relation. He says: "Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and abilities; if that object be entirely new to him, he will not be able, by the most accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to discover any of its causes or effects. Adam though his rational faculties be supposed, at the very first, entirely perfect, could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of water that it would suffocate him, or from the light and warmth of fire that it would consume him. No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the sense, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it; nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact." ( An Enquiry, Sction IV, paragraph 6, part 1). In some cases, according to Hume, we are reasoning about the future based on our observations about the past. To convince us that conclusions of causal reasoning are not relations of ideas, but are merely matters of fact, Hume asks that whether we can predict about the result of an event as the effect that is caused by another event by just reasoning? Probably, we will answer yes, but that is because we have seen things that happened that way before, and when presented with new objects or circumstances, we do not really know what to expect. For example, we can predict that any object will fall to the ground because we have seen those event happen all the times, but if we had never seen objects fall, we would not have been able to tell that they would fall if we dropped them. Hume writes:

"We are apt to imagine that we could discover these effects by the mere operation of our reason, without experience. We fancy, that were we brought on a sudden into this world, we could at first have inferred that one Billiard-ball would communicate motion to another upon impulse; and that we needed not to have waited for the event, in order to pronounce with certainty concerning it. Such is the influence of custom, that, where it is strongest, it not only covers our natural ignorant, but even conceals itself, and seems not to take place, merely because it is found in the highest degree." ( An Enquiry, Section IV, part 1, paragraph 8). Now, Hume develops a new concept; that is custom. It is by custom that we draw conclusions, but not by reasoning or idea that certain effect is to be followed by certain cause. Even if we can use reasoning and invention to predict the effect, but these reasoning and invention are not always trusted, not saying that they may be queer, or fictional, or unrealistic. By Hume's language, they may be arbitrary as he wrote: "Were any object presented to us, and were we required to pronounce concerning the effect, which will result from it, without consulting past observation; after what manner, I beseech you, must the mind proceed in this operation? It must invent or imagine some event, which it ascribes to the object as its effect; and it is plain that this invention must be entirely arbitrary. The mind can never possibly find the effect in the supposed cause by the most accurate scrutiny and examination. For the effect is totally different from the cause, and consequently can never be discovered in it. Motion in the second billiard-ball is a quite distinct event from motion in the first; nor is there anything in the one to suggest the smallest hint of the other. Stone or piece of metal raised into the air, and left without any support, immediately falls: but to consider the matter of priori, is there anything we discover in this situation which can beget the idea of a downward, rather than an upward, or any other motion, in the stone or metal?" ( An Enquiry, Section IV, part 1, paragraph 9). However, the strongest persuation saying that in the relation of Cause and Effect, there is no necessary connection or no evidence that can be evoked in the reasoning process. Finally, Hume concludes:

In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause, and the first invention or conception of it, a priori, must be entirely arbitrary. And even after it is suggested, the conjunction of it with the cause must appear equally arbitrary; since there are always many other effects, which, to reason, must seem fully as consistent and natural. In vain, therefore should we pretend to determine any single event, or infer any cause and effect, without the assistance of observation and experience." (An Enquiry, section IV, paragraph 11, part I)

Another example that Hume gave was the case of eating bread by looking at the following sentences of a cause and effect:
Phrase A: The bread I eat nourished me yesterday
Phrase B: Today If I eat the bread, it will nourish me
But the problem is what happens if the bread I eat today is poisoned? If so, then the bread that I eat today won't nourish me but kill me instead. Thus, there obviously is no connection between the bread that I ate before and the bread that I am going to eat today. So, when reasoning, the matter becomes worse and more likely to fall into a false property. Hence, there is no real connection in reasoning between the cause and the effect.


B/ According to Hume, do we have any proof that "external object" resemble our impressions or ideas of them?

Hume says that we can have proof or ideas that resemble to external objects. He found three relations that characterize the behavior of ideas: resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect. In his first relation which he names resemblance, Hume says that our idea comes from the things or other ideas that resemble it. For example, the idea of the mermaid is a combination image of a female human and a fish. Without knowing what a fish looks like, no one can imagine to cling the fish tail to the body of a girl to form the image of a mermaid. Of course, with the idea of a mermaid, it shows us the obvious proofs that everyone living on this earth should know: the proof of a fish tail and the proof of a female figure. Besides, the connotation meaning of that mermaid idea is to imply people who have predominant appearance that exceeds the truth of its quality; so, by looking at some people whose appearance overstated their corresponding personality, a person can easily comes up with the idea of a mermaid. In addition to sight, sound is a strong impression that can cause our resemblance ideas; by listening to a sound, we can know the resources from which the sound is caused and how it can be created. For example, the sound of a wooden stick that beats on another wooden object is different from the sound of a wooden stick that beats on a tin can. Once we hear those sounds and see how they have been created, next time, if we hear them, we can imagine or have concepts of what form that same sounds. But without seeing the wooden stick and the tin can, we can hardly guest how that sound is created; by that, I mean the kind of objects that cause that sound. In An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section II, "Of the Origin of Idea", Hume classifies perceptions into two categories: ideas and impressions. Ideas are different from impressions in the meaning that they are less lively perceptions than those of impressions:

Here therefore we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated Thoughts and Ideas.

For the definition of impression, Hume writes:

The other species want a name in our language, to rank them under a general term or appellation. Let us, therefore, use a little freedom, and call them Impression; employing that word in a sense somewhat different from the usual. By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or hate, or desire, or will. (An Enquiry, section II, paragraph 3).

Furthermore, he explains that thoughts are powerful and can go beyond the universe and is unbounded. However, mostly they are perceptions that are copies of impressions or of more lively ones:

But though our thought seems to possess this unbounded liberty, we shall find, upon a nearer examination, that it is really confined within very narrow limits, and that all this creative power of the mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded to us by the senses and experience. (An Enquiry, section II, paragraph 5).

For abstract ideas, we can also find proofs for them. For example, the mathematical statement "a triangle is a closed shape that has three sides" can be checked to see if it is true by understanding what three sides mean, and by drawing a picture of the three lines that intersect one another to form the shape of a triangle. The knowledge of lines are of course come from our previous impression or learning that there are in fact straight lines in our world. Also, once we know the definition of a triangle, if someone says " a triangle does not have three sides," we would know immediately that that statement is not true due to our previous perception of a triangle. Since it is very hard or impossible to conjure a new idea without a previous specific impression involving things contained in that idea, there is always a proof that an external object will resemble to a certain specific idea or impression.

C/ According to Descartes, God has established certain laws of nature and God has "impressed in our souls notions of these laws that, after having reflected sufficiently, we cannot deny that they are strictyly adhered to in everything that exists or occurs in the world" (Discourse on Method, part 5, paragraph 1). Does Hume agree with Descartes that we can know that God has impressed notions of nature directly to ours soul?

No, Hume doesn't agree with Descartes that we can know that God has impressed notions of laws of nature directly to our souls for the following reasons:

First of all, Hume says that there is no necessary connection between cause and effect. If there is no connection between cause and effect then how can we know what really causes an effect although we can presume there is connection, and how can we know that God is the one who caused the laws of nature to be impressed in our souls? He can prove that there is no connection using external impression and internal recognition. For external impression, as I already explained in part (a) above that with external objects, we can always find proofs through our perceptions of them by senses or by contact experience. If we cannot find any existing proof for something through our perceptions of it, then we cannot say that that something exists; for example, like a mermaid if one to creates the mermaid, he or she has to know in advance that there is a tail of a fish which he or she always sees in real life and there is a beautiful girl image which he or she always sees in real life, and with those 2 real images, he or she then combines them to create the imaginary image of a mermaid, God's existence can be proved by a figure of something must have already existed like God, perfect and all-knowing, but Hume thinks that we can't find any proof of such a perfect and all-knowing, or omniscient person who did really exists; thus, for an external proof, we fail to prove that God is the resemblance of something existed. Hume writes:

In reality, there is no part of matter, that does ever, by its sensible qualities, discover any power or energy, or give us ground to imagine, that it could produce anything, or be followed by any other object which we could denominate it effect. Solidity, extension, motion; these qualities are all complete in themselves, and never point out any other event which may result from them. The scenes of the universe are continually shifting, and one object follows another in an interrupted succession; but the power of force, which actuates the whole machine, is entirely concealed from us, and never discovers itself in any of the sensible qualities of body. ( An Enquiry, section VII, part I, paragraph 8).

And: "It is impossible, therefore, that idea of power can be derived from the comtemplation of bodies, in single instances of their operation; because no bodies ever discover any power, which can be the original of this idea (An Enquiry, Section VII, part I, paragraph 8).

Since we can't find any idea of power or the necessary connection through the resemblance of external or real objects, how can we know that God is the power to cause the notions of laws in our souls or He is the one who caused the universe to operate?

Second, Hume does not think that by only reasoning, we can create new ideas about things around us since every of our new ideas can only be initiated by some previous impresions of real things that we could see, hear or feel. And if there may be a new idea created through reasoning, that idea may be very arbitrary including being queer, or strange or unrealistic, or too fictional to be true. Therefore, if we don't have any provable idea that God exists, can we think that He exists? Hume thinks that the idea of the existence of God is only an imaginable idea by reasoning but not by any impression or real sense that makes us know that He exists since no one has ever seen God before. Specifically speaking, we can use reasoning to say that since animals have related parts of the body, God may be the creator of these related parts. The related parts are obviously the impression of the real things in nature.

To prove that God has not impressed in our souls notions of the laws of nature or that God doesn't exist by our mind, Hume gives an example that if God causes us to know how things operate then why our mind can control some parts of the body but not other parts? If we know the principle - the laws of nature -that God has impressed in our soul upon which our mind can direct certain parts of the body, we should know that by that same principle, our mind can also use to direct other parts of the body which it actually cannot. For example, we can use our mind to move our legs or arms and hands but not our kidneys our our hearts. Once our hearts cease to beat, we die. Can we control our heart so that we can live again by using our mind? Of course not. Hume says that some philosophers cannot answer that question why the mind cannot control the body, and therefore, death comes when the heart stops beating, they claim that God exists and that He is the one who causes the heart to stop beating because human beings must die due to the sin that Eva made. But then, the idea of God cannot be proved by any external object or any real sense such as seeing, or hearing because no one has ever seen God or has ever heard him talk directly to them (only a few claims to see God - the Saints - but the majority of men don't). The idea of God is still considered as a suggestion or by a reasoning since we don't have something real that exists that is as perfect as God's characteristics, we cannot conclude that God is a resemblance of somthing like it.

Hume writes:

Is there any principle in all nature more mysterious than the union of soul with body; by which a supposed spiritual substance acquires such an influence over a material one, that the most refined thought is able to actuate the gross matter? Were we empowered, by a secret wish, to remove mountains, or control the planets in their orbit; this extensive authority would not be more extraordinary, nor more beyond our comprehension. But if we must know this power; we must know ist connextion with the effect; we must know the secret union of our soul and body, and the nature of both these substances; by which the one is able to operate, in so many instance, upon the other. (An Enquiry, Section VII, part I, paragraph 11).

Thus, we cannot know any power or any cause that can show us the cause of the operation of our soul and body, and of the universe. So, why do we think that there is a power such as God's power that can cause all of these relations? Hume writes:

But to hasten to a conclusion of this argument, which is already drawn out to too great a length: we have sought in vain for an idea of power or necessary connexion in all the sources from which we could suppose it to be derived. It appears that in single instances of the operation of bodies, we never can, by our utmost scrutiny, discover any thing but one event following another, without being able to comprehend any force or power by which the causes operates, or any connexion between it and it supposed effect... The authority of the will over its own faculties and ideas is not a whit more comprehensible: so that, upon the whole, there appears not, throughout all nature, any one instance of connextion which is conceived by us. (An Enquiry, Chapter VII, Part II, paragraph 1).

Definitely, not. Hence, God did not impress notions of laws of nature upon our souls because we can't find the necessary impressions fo all the relations between things (in our body, nor in the universe) by external objects, internal recognition nor by reasoning.

However, Hume says that we can say God exists by looking at the things He created around us. As I just said above that we can find related parts in all kinds of animal that have the same functions; for example the tiger's eyes related to the human's eyes; the monkey looks like human beings; thus, we can say that God did create other animals before He created human beings. The Designer theory is a theory that says that there must be a designer who designs all the related parts of animals. Hence, God is proved to exist not by an impression or by something that resembles to Him that did exist but by looking at the real things existing around us that we can say that God exists because he is the designer of those meaning things. Hume's theory of the Designer is an interesting theory about God as a designer.


Works Cited

Hume, David. "An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding." Mondern Philosophy - An Anthology of Primary Sources. Eds. Roger Ariew and Eric Watkins. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. 1998. 491-557.